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HESBURGH ROOM

“The Relevance of Emotions for Ethical Discourse: A Thesis in Philosophical Anthropology” (Buket Korkut Raptis, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University)

Aristotle explained the role of emotions in being virtuous in his ethical works and in the *Rhetoric* he showed the relevance of emotions for being convinced regarding practical issues. In this paper, we will argue, from an Aristotelian perspective, that emotions have an evaluative function required for engaging in ethical discourse. After having explained this function, we will argue that the capacity of ethical discourse is what distinguishes humans from animal species. This capacity, we will argue, is not *Logos*, for *Logos* only allows us to achieve understanding, which is presupposed by evaluative judgement, but is surpassed by it. In other words, ethical evaluation presupposes understanding provided by the capacity of *Logos*, but also requires an emotional response, which is provided by a higher capacity, we name “Gönül.” In Turkish, *Gönül* refers to the proper capacity of heart, which regulates emotions. On this issue, we will follow Scheler rather than Aristotle and argue that some animal species also have the capacity of *Logos*, and regarding *Logos*, there is a matter of degree rather than an essential difference between humans and other animals. Hence we argue that it is the capacity of *Gönül*, i.e., the capacity of ethical discourse that distinguishes humans from animals. Although our conclusion in philosophical anthropology might be seen counter-Aristotelian, it actually follows from Aristotle’s view on the relevance of emotions for ethical discourse.

Buket Korkut Raptis is associate professor of philosophy at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University in Turkey. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame in 2011. Her areas of interest include ethics and philosophical anthropology.

“To What End: Energeia as Love” (Jeffery Nicholas, Providence College)

This presentation will be a summary of a chapter of the book I am writing, *Love and Politics*. Chapter Three focuses on developing a metaphysical biology to underwrite the MacIntyrean concept of practices. I shall argue that Love is fundamental reality. Being arises, not as production nor as competition, but as reproduction through desire. Aristotle captures this reality in his concept of Energeia. George Blair demonstrates that Aristotle invented this term to capture the notion of fullness-in-act. In living bodies, this Energeia is best captured by the concept Eros—a drive for life. Here I take issue with the Freudian and Marcusean conception of Eros, but I also take issue with Kelvin Knight’s interpretation of Aristotle. All action aims at the object of desire, and in rational beings, like homo sapiens sapiens, love returns to itself in two ways. First, it recognizes itself as an

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object of desire—the love of love. Theologically speaking, this captures the motive of God’s creative act. God reproduces love through creation which aims at a being capable of loving and being loved. Second, it becomes the “for-the-sake-of” of human life. Loving is an end in-itself; in fact, loving is the end of human life, and, thus, the *Energieia* of *homo sapiens sapiens*. Practices, then, contra MacIntyre and Knight, must involve activities of loving. The painter who does not love painting will not grasp the best internal goods of the practice. As Anthony de Mello says, we must embrace those activities that we love, for they are our path to God.

Jeffery L. Nicholas is an associate professor in the Philosophy Department at Providence College. He is the author of Reason, Tradition, and the Good: MacIntyre's Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. He is a research associate at the Center for Aristotelian Studies and Critical Theory at Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania and at the Center for Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics at London Metropolitan University. He has given talks in the US, UK, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Greece, and Poland. His current research is on love and politics.

“Love as a Virtue of Public Discourse” (Tristan Rogers, California State University, East Bay)

The political slogan “Love Trumps Hate” rose to prominence during the 2016 Presidential Election as a rallying cry for those opposed to then candidate Donald Trump. In the summer of 2017, the truth behind this slogan received support from an unlikely place: The pro-Trump “Mother of all Rallies,” where Hawk Newsome, the President of Black Lives Matter New York, was given an impromptu invitation to speak to the crowd. Newsome’s speech, which was cheered by the pro-Trump crowd, drew on themes of common identity (“I am an American”), common creed (“love thy neighbor”), and common purpose (“If we really want to make America great, we do it together”). This paper explores these themes as a basis for developing an understanding of the virtues of public discourse. In the spirit of Newsome’s speech, I will argue that love is a virtue of public discourse, and that if Americans have any hope of emerging from these dark divisive times, they must rediscover the ancient wisdom in Christ’s injunction to “love your enemies.” (Matthew 5:44) I begin from the premise that love is a virtue because it aims at the good of another. I also understand public discourse as a conversation among citizens aimed at the good. But for a conversation to truly aim at the good, I argue, it must be characterized by love, not politics, power, or even civility. Love is a virtue of public discourse aimed at the true good. Thus, the slogan “Love Trumps Hate” is true, but not in the way its supporters have thought. Given its association with a partisan political campaign, the love in “Love Trumps Hate” seems to be a synonym for compassion, while hate codes for conservative political policies. But if love is going to triumph over

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hate, then partisans on both sides must recover the love of the transcendent that allows us to love our enemies.

Tristan J. Rogers is a lecturer in the Philosophy Department at California State University, East Bay. He earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Arizona in 2017, where he was a member of the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom. Dr. Rogers works in political philosophy, ethics, and ancient philosophy. His dissertation, titled Virtue Politics, brings virtue ethics and political philosophy into conversation by examining the problem of political authority from a virtue ethics perspective. He is currently writing a book manuscript based on this work.

JOYCE ROOM

“Navigating the New Dark Ages” (Jason Hannan, University of Winnipeg)

In her book, *Kill All Normies* (2017), journalist and cultural commentator Angela Nagle offers a graphic and disturbing look at the state of civil discourse today. Nagle depicts a public sphere rapidly being torn apart by the viciousness and toxicity of the digital culture wars — a battle for the heart and soul of Western civilization currently being fought on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 4Chan. At the heart of this new civil war are online subcultures like the Alt-Right, the Incel movement, and liberal identity politics. The digital culture wars are devouring the last vestiges of civility and rational discourse in our public sphere, culminating in mass shamings, free speech battles, white nationalist marches, campus riots, and even gun violence. When MacIntyre predicted the “coming ages of barbarism and darkness,” his pronouncement could not have been more prophetic.

This paper is based on my forthcoming book *Ethics Under Capital: MacIntyre, Communication, and the Culture Wars*. I will make three points. First, *After Virtue* offers the tools for making sense of the digital culture wars, which I describe as emotivism on steroids. Second, I will make a case for the recognition of a new character in the social drama of digital modernity: the troll. In our new dark ages, the troll has become a recognizable public figure, and trolling a normalized genre of political speech. No one epitomizes the character of the troll more than Donald Trump. Third, MacIntyre’s model of moral discourse, what I call rational agonism, is one of the best forms of resistance we have against digital capitalism’s full-scale assault upon the public sphere today.

Jason Hannan is Associate Professor in the Department of Rhetoric & Communications at the University of Winnipeg. His is the editor of Philosophical Profiles in the Theory of Communication (2012) and Truth in the Public Sphere (2016), and the author of Ethics Under Capital: MacIntyre, Communication, and the Culture Wars (forthcoming). His research focuses on the public sphere, digital media, posthumanism, and

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animal ethics. His current book projects include Animals Under Capital (Sydney University Press) and Conservatism: The Denial of Reality.

CARMICHAEL ROOM

“Desire, Goods, the Good and Human Flourishing: Organisational Implications for Enterprise at the Service of Society” (Geoff Moore, Durham University)

This paper takes it as axiomatic that business organisations of all types (generically, enterprises) should be subject to a social purpose, which thereby places enterprise at the service of society. In a world in which mankind’s impact upon the ecological environment is such that the future of civilization is by no means assured, it asks what it might mean for such organisations to be at the service of society in times such as these.

By way of analysis of this motivating question, the paper explores human desire since it is such desires, as revealed in patterns of consumption, which are at the heart of the ecological crisis. In laying out the nature of such desires, and in exploring goods, the good and human flourishing as those things which should motivate such desires, it draws on resources provided particularly by Alasdair MacIntyre (1981/2007; 1999; 2016), but also by René Girard (1966; 1977; 1987).

The solution which the paper moves to involves enterprises becoming *reformulated social enterprises* with a corporate purpose which enables them to play their part in the redirection and re-education of desire. Such enterprises would apprentice their employees into practices, and would thereby instruct them in the ordered and balanced pursuit of three different kinds of goods – internal, common and external. Consequently, and drawing again on Girardian insights, this might just lead to a ratcheting-down of desire, and a world that is habitable for our children and grandchildren.

Geoff Moore is Professor of Business Ethics at Durham University Business School, UK, where he teaches modules related to sustainability and ethics, chairs the ‘Ethics, Responsibility and Sustainability’ initiative which is part of the School’s strategy, and researches in business ethics broadly defined. His work has a particular focus on virtue ethics and the application of Alasdair MacIntyre’s ideas to organisations. A summary of this work may be found in Virtue at Work: Ethics for Individuals, Managers, and Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

“Q: ‘What’s Next’ for Management Education? A: Reclaiming Economics as the Practice of Moral Philosophy” (Ron Nahser, De Paul University)

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It came as a great surprise to many of us, certainly to me, to read in the “Prologue: *After Virtue* after a Quarter of a Century” to the 3rd edition that “plain persons in a variety of practices... were the intended and, pleasingly often, the actual readers of *After Virtue*...” He goes on to say he hoped these readers were “able to recognize in its central theses articulations of thoughts that they themselves had already begun to formulate and expressions of feeling by which they themselves were already to some degree moved.”

This proposal outlines the movements of one such inspired reader.

Business schools, in response to many obvious pressures, have long wrestled with how to improve the ethical perspectives of executives and students. Coming from a business background and more recently engaged in the immensely successful and pervasive MBA education model, I quickly noticed the inability of students to grasp the core relevance in the usual way business ethics was taught, specifically the “tool kit” using various philosophical approaches. This comes as no surprise since MacIntyre points out the limits of this Enlightenment Project: “the secular rational basis of morality.” Alternately, he asked the question: “What is the best kind of life for a human being like me to lead?”

Can you ask the same question of individuals in organizations about the core strategies which drive their organizations— profit, nonprofit and government - as they strive to develop products and services which meet the needs of society through the market? Of course...and we must.

This ancient practice has evolved especially in recent times with the rise of the discipline of Economics. The battle has been fought as to what is the purpose of economics: how and whom does it serve. Most recently, the issue has been resolved by the primacy of “maximizing return to shareholders.” This, needless to say, is under great attack today with all the evidence around us of the resulting inequality and environmental crisis.

So what does the practice of the virtues have to do with this? Simply that virtues must be the practice of deciding what choices to make in what organizations should do – driven by the individuals within them – to serve the needs of society, sustainably.

The talk will present real-time examples of curricula and executive and student projects which reflect how you can create sustainable value driven by the practice of the virtues as MacIntyre defines them. Drawing from the subtitle of MacIntyre’s latest book, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity*, we design programs to help students and executives recognize their *Desire*, next help them with *Practical*

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Reasoning through an arc of pragmatic inquiry, and then articulate a *Narrative*, resulting in what is commonly called the “Business Case.”

This is how we bring together the key sub-themes of the conference: *Narrative, institutions, and Practice* to challenge and reclaim Economics as the practice of Moral Philosophy.

Ron Nahser is the director of the Urban Sustainable Management Programs at DePaul University, and Senior Fellow Institute for Nature and Culture, Department of Environmental Science and Studies. Dr. Nahser is Professor of Pragmatic Philosophy and Ecological Economics, Center for Confucian Entrepreneurship and East Asia Civilizations, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China; and also Provost Emeritus of Presidio Graduate School, San Francisco (offering the first accredited MBA in Sustainable Management). In addition to numerous articles, reviews and book chapters, he is the author of Learning to Read the Signs: Reclaiming Pragmatism in Business (2nd edition - 2013) and Journeys to Oxford: Nine Pragmatic Inquiries into the Practice of Values in Business and Education. He is also Executive Director of Corporantes, Inc., and Strategic Advisor to the UN Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) Secretariat. Dr. Nahser earned a BA degree from the University of Notre Dame, an MBA degree from Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, an MA degree in Religious Studies from Loyola Chicago/Mundelein College and a Ph.D. in American Pragmatic Philosophy from DePaul University.

“Facebook as a Platform for Women’s Deliberation about the Common Goods Associated to Domestic Service in Colombia” (Tatiana Rodriguez Leal, Los Andes University; Caleb Bernacchio, IESE Business School)

MacIntyre argues that deliberation is a central aspect to human flourishing (1999; 2016) and that it is through deliberation that “we learn learn to distinguish what is good from what is taken to be good” (2016: 49). Social media has brought about an unprecedented ability to connect with other humans overcoming spatial and time constraints. Tools like Facebook offer a platform for frequent, continuous, multi-voiced a-synchronic and synchronic deliberation that was before limited to those who shared similar spatial coordinates and was often reserved to other markers of class and gender. Drawing from three years of online posts on a secret all-womens’ group on Facebook with more than 12,000 members, we argue that Facebook groups are a promising platform for deliberation with emerging affordances for the renegotiation of common goods.

In Colombia it is common for middle and upper class families to employ domestic workers. Through a discourse analyses approach the paper analyses occurrences of deliberation on a womens’ secret Facebook group around the topic of domestic workers. The data analyzed comprises a

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collection of Facebook posts between 2015 and 2019. Through engaged and often contentious conversations women of middle and upper class within the Colombian community reflect, discuss, question and challenge the role of the cleaning lady in their households and their relationship to the employer families. The conversations allow women who employ cleaning ladies in their houses to ask for advice, reflect, discern, share and debate ideas pertaining the role of the cleaning lady in the house, the standards of excellence that they should aspire to, and the nature of the employer-employee relationship. Women also voice their concerns on social inequality and appeal to the improvement of the working conditions of cleaning ladies in their own houses and those of their counterparts. As such, the Facebook group becomes a space where common goods are challenged and redefined.

While the conversations are rich and exhibit strong conversational virtues, it remains to be seen whether they indeed translate into offline action. In spite of this, evidence suggests that online deliberations may have the power to affect cultural behaviors and perceptions of who a good cleaning lady is and what a good employer-domestic worker relationship looks like in the Colombian context. It is therefore worth reflecting from a MacIntyrean perspective on the potentialities of social media as a platform for deliberation and therefore as a powerful tool towards human flourishing.

Tatiana Rodríguez Leal is Professor of Leadership, Ethics and Organizational Behavior at the School of Management of Universidad de los Andes. She holds a DPhil in Education from University of Oxford and a Mater's in Education from Harvard University. Tatiana's research focuses on adult learning and development at work exploring people's efforts to align to work demands. Theoretically Tatiana has drawn from MacIntyre's critique of the manager and the MacIntyre-inspired debate on Business Ethics. Tatiana is a member of the International Society of MacIntyrean Enquiry (ISME) since 2015.

Caleb Bernacchio is a PhD candidate in Management and Business Ethics at IESE Business School. His work focuses on the relationship between MacIntyre's moral philosophy and organization studies. He also acts as a webmaster for the International Society of MacIntyrean Enquiry (ISME).

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SALON C, SMITH BALLROOM

“Enframing, Practice, and the Natural Law” (William Hannegan, Saint Louis University)

Enframing, Practice, and the Natural Law - Abstract Traditional natural law theory, as articulated by Thomas Aquinas and developed by contemporary philosophers such as Anthony Lisska, Henry Veatch, David Oderberg, Russell Hittinger, and Edward Feser, grounds well-being and morality in intrinsic human nature. Understanding traditional natural law requires us to understand the concept of intrinsic nature, as well related concepts such as teleology and flourishing. In this paper, I argue that proponents of traditional natural law theory should be attentive to the work of Continental philosophers of technology. The work of Martin Heidegger and other philosophers of technology such as Albert Borgmann and Bernard Stiegler can show us that modern technology poses a threat to learning and understanding the core concepts of natural law. According to Heidegger, modern technology “is a mode of revealing.” It determines the way being appears to us. Modern technology makes us see the world around us as mere “standing reserve,” or a mere source of energy that we can extract and turn to our own purposes, and it “drives out every other possibility of revealing.” Because modern technology as enframing drives out other forms of revealing, it presents an obstacle to learning the core concepts involved in traditional natural law, such as intrinsic nature, teleology, and flourishing. I argue that advocates for traditional natural law can respond to the threat of modern technology by engaging in, and promoting, practices that reveal natures. I give an extended examination of the practice of farming, and I show that such a practice can help furnish us with the basic concepts needed for understanding traditional natural law.

William Hannegan is a Ph.D. student at Saint Louis University where he writes on St. Thomas Aquinas and biological function. He received his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Dallas in 2011 and earned an M.A. in philosophy from Northern Illinois University in 2013. He then spent four years as a Catholic monk at St. Louis Abbey and taught at St. Louis Priory School.

“Trust, Empathy, and the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre’s Thomistic Ontology of Moral Life” (Theodore Lai, University of Chicago)

As Hannah Arendt remarks, judging is what remains when universal moral standards disappear, requiring us to “think without a banister”. Yet this assumes that subjective judgments are absent of objective morality. Our subjectivity may arise from the very objectivity that postmodern thinkers claim to be disappearing. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar argument in his critique of Knud Løgstrup and the ethical demand.

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For Løgstrup, an ontology of trust gives rise to the demand to trust others or invite their trust. Trust brackets universal norms, in that we judge how to trust given particular circumstances. For this reason, the ethical demand is incommensurable with rule-following that obscures the fact that human beings are particular agents caught in particular situations. Responding to the demand must be for the sake of another, and not for metaphysical ends.

For MacIntyre, this places Løgstrup at odds with the natural law tradition. MacIntyre demonstrates the ethical demand's reliance on a Thomistic-Aristotelian account of virtue, showing that trustworthiness presupposes a rule not to lie, and that responding to the needs of others requires virtuous habits. For MacIntyre, one could not respond to the ethical demand were it not for universal laws. Uncoupling trust from ultimate ends misconceives the natural law as extratemporal principles irrelevant to the particularities of lived experience.

Løgstrup's defenders argue that the ethical demand only describes the underlying ontology of moral life, and is not an account of ethics that can be criticized for rejecting other traditions. Yet MacIntyre remained sensitive to Løgstrup's ontology in demonstrating its reliance on the natural law. I suggest that MacIntyre formulated an ontology compatible with law when he embarked on his study of Edith Stein, "a phenomenologist who moved towards rather than away from the ontology characteristic of Thomism".

On MacIntyre's reading, Steinian empathy presupposes laws, or Geist, that shape behavior, such that the 'rules' of interaction become embedded in empathetic experience. Steinian empathy, on MacIntyre's representation, resembles his reformulation of the ethical demand: both emphasize an ontology of moral life that incorporates universal laws. MacIntyre understood manifestations of the natural law as embedded in the ontology of trust, in a way analogous to Geist emerging from empathy. This essay hypothesizes that MacIntyre's study of Stein shaped his critique of Løgstrup by providing an ontology informing his interpretation of the ethical demand and fueling his subsequent efforts to reconcile it with a Thomistic-Aristotelian account of virtue ethics. It argues that a closer study of Steinian empathy can build on MacIntyre's efforts and, pace Arendt, provide a different route to return objectivity to subjective experience.

Theodore Lai recently graduated with an MA in Political Philosophy at the University of Chicago and studied Philosophy at Yale-NUS College, Singapore. His graduate thesis examines how the emphasis on epistemic justification in contemporary theories of political action can lead to their deployment in self-defeating ways and ultimate disempower political movements. His current research examines how the Munich and Göttingen Circles of phenomenology, particularly the thought of Husserl, Stein and Lipps, influenced and changed the discipline of political philosophy in the 20th century.

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“Thomistic Aristotelianism as a Response to Moral Alienation” (Christopher Lutz, Saint Meinrad Seminary and School of Theology)

In *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity*, Alasdair MacIntyre commends Bernard Williams’s critique of modern morality. In 1965, Williams began to criticize modern moral philosophy on the grounds that it alienated the human agent from his own projects and convictions. Modern moral philosophy was, remarkably, a danger to the moral integrity of its adherents. Williams responds to this moral alienation by placing the agent’s response to his own moral convictions at the center of the moral picture. MacIntyre finds Williams’s prescription inadequate; for MacIntyre, our response to moral alienation must also include a collaborative, neo-Aristotelian or Thomistic-Aristotelian pursuit of the truth about goods.

MacIntyre’s treatment of Williams raises a pair of questions for the history of ethics: First, is moral alienation a uniquely modern problem? It seems unlikely that it is. Second, how does MacIntyre’s Thomism avoid moral alienation? If late scholastic and early modern authors who quoted St. Thomas Aquinas in defense of natural law can be accused of moral alienation, then we need to see how MacIntyre’s Thomism differs from theirs.

We will begin by presenting Williams’s critique of moral alienation from his own writings. Next we will consider the meanings of ‘law’ and ‘natural law’ in three influential Catholic authors of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, Francisco Suarez, Edmund Pourchot, and St. Alphonsus Liguori. All three treated St. Thomas Aquinas as an authority on morals, yet all three placed Thomistic teachings on goods, natural law, and virtue into frameworks that introduced subtle forms of moral alienation into Catholic morality.

Finally we will review the Thomistic-Aristotelianism that MacIntyre endorses, a movement to recover the teleology of St. Thomas Aquinas, and to renew his account of human action and his teleological approach to human excellence. In this form of Thomism, the collaborative search for the truth about goods and human excellence, coupled with the demand for integrity in human action, constitutes a fully adequate response to the threat of moral alienation.

MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism, like Servais Pinckaers’s history of Catholic moral theology and Heiko Oberman’s history of the Reformation, presents a promising challenge to interpreters of Christian traditions. Generally, these historical narratives invite scholars to reexamine relationships between authors, changing interpretive frameworks, and canonical texts in every Christian tradition. Specifically, MacIntyre’s Thomistic-Aristotelianism offers Catholic

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moralists a welcome opportunity to retool their presentation of Catholic moral teaching to speak intelligibly to an individualistic, secularizing, and morally alienated contemporary culture.

Christopher Lutz studied in the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America, where he focused on history, Thomism, and moral philosophy. He is a founding member of the International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry. He has two books, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and Philosophy (Lexington Books, 2004, 2009) and Reading Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (Continuum, 2012), and he edited the special MacIntyre issue of the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Fall 2014). He teaches Philosophy at Saint Meinrad Seminary and School of Theology in southern Indiana where he lives with his wife and children.