HESBURGH ROOM

“Ignatieff’s ‘Ordinary Virtues’” (Ron Beadle, Northumbria University)

Michael Ignatieff’s (2017) ‘Ordinary Virtues’ has been widely praised (e.g. Traub, 2017) as an erudite argument with global significance. The book is based on a major research project conducted in seven conflict zones which marked the centenary of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. The project team were commissioned to understand better the conditions for communal conflict and the prospects for peace in an age of globalisation.

Ignatieff, former leader of the Canadian Liberal Party, Director of the Central European University, public intellectual and renowned liberal commentator would not be unfairly understood as epitomising the very international metropolitan elite that are the ire of conservatives and nativists around the world and who were identified and critiqued by Alasdair MacIntyre throughout his career. Against this background, Ignatieff’s conclusion – that ‘ordinary virtues’ rather than liberal principles represent the best avenue to inter-communal peace, is both surprising and potentially significant.

In this paper I will attempt to present a reading of Ignatieff’s text; one that centres on two inter-related questions. First, I will consider whether Ignatieff’s ‘Ordinary Virtues’ are virtues at all. My negative conclusion is based upon the rarely used insight from MacIntyre’s Whose Justice, Which Rationality (1988) that pursuit of the goods of effectiveness itself requires behaviours which mimic, but must not be understood to be, virtues. As a crude example, that the interests of self-preservation are sometimes served by promise keeping does not render gangsters who keep their promises to state agencies virtuous.

Second, I will consider whether Ignatieff’s book and the wider liberal disenchantment within which it may turn out to exemplify, are occasions best described in terms of an exhausted tradition reaching out to its rivals for answers to questions that it cannot otherwise resolve. This analysis also finds its basis in MacIntyre’s 1988 text. Ignatieff himself anticipates the argument, even if he ignores its source, and addresses it through examples of earlier liberals who have used virtue-based. I shall argue that these arguments are, at best, in need of development. The paper shall thereby attempt to show how MacIntyre’s theses and arguments might be put to work in significant contemporary debates.

Finally, I shall draw on my 23 years’ experience as a locally elected liberal democrat politician in the UK to reflect on the potential for a rapprochement between the community politics represented by some liberal and socialist traditions and MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism.
Ron Beadle is a Professor of Organization and Business Ethics at Northumbria University, UK. Ron’s research into the virtues in the context of work has been published in Business Ethics Quarterly, the Journal of Business Ethics and Organisation Studies. He has contributed chapters and had work republished within a number of anthologies in virtue ethics, meaningful work and the Circus, which is the focus of his empirical research. Ron is the Convenor of the Circus Research Network (Britain and Ireland) and served on the Executive of the International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry for its first decade.

“Truth, Irony, and Practical Wisdom” (Matthew Madruga, San Francisco State University)

Problematising contemporary moral discourse by markets, technology, and the state has left said categories increasingly vacuous, devoid of any meaningful content, and subject to the whims and capriciousness of institutions that are beholden not to people, but to institutions whose responsibilities often run contra human well-being. What then is a solution to this problem? Merely offering philosophical platitudes or trite commentary that critiques these systems is simply not sufficient to effectuate a perceptible change; rather, there needs to be a genuine shift in relation to how we grapple with these institutions. A shift that emphasizes a set of values that are situated to question the veridicality of the institutions that are the market, technology, and the state and proffer practical answers about how we ought to live our lives. The values in this shift are truth, irony, and wisdom. In contemporary moral discourse, truth has been eroded to such an extent that it has been mitigated to merely moral rhetoric. It is imperative that we understand and know the truth about the banality of technology, the nefariousness of the state, and the alienating effects of markets. Only once we have restored some semblance of the truth can we develop a sense of irony. The type of irony that is to be extolled and critiqued here is a Rortian variety, wherein we recognize that we may never have the requisite vocabulary to address our contemporary problems but nevertheless strive to transcend these boundaries to become the autonomous private ironist that is still contingently bound to social relationships. Finally, we can practice wisdom. We can never achieve wisdom in an absolute sense, instead it must be a practice, an activity that is at once of a practical nature yet also tied to shared ideals that are to some extent ineffable without context and historical situatedness. Once we have these three values working in concert with each other, then there can be a genuine shift in how we understand contemporary moral discourse.

Matthew Madruga is a graduate student in philosophy at San Francisco State University. Prior to arriving at SFSU, Madruga was a Marshall-Brennan Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. His areas of interest include Philosophy of Law, Political Philosophy, Virtue Ethics, and Chinese Philosophy.
“Notes towards a Grammar of Commitment” (Ronan Sharkey, Institut Catholique de Paris)

Take the case, now rare, of an adolescent who joins a political party or revolutionary movement and remains a member through thick and thin over the course of a lifetime. A long-term commitment of this or any kind raises interesting psychological and sociological questions which are not without relevance to philosophy; but what is it to think philosophically about commitment? What would a philosophy of commitment attempt to say? What shape would it have if it is to remain philosophical, i.e. if it is to maintain a connexion with philosophical arguments from the recent and more distant past?

Contemporary treatments of this theme tend to approach it from one of two directions. Either they remain broadly within an existentialist (Sartrian or Kierkegaardian) perspective and raise, quite rightly and relevantly, questions about the paradoxical relationship between commitment and freedom (expressed in Merleau-Ponty’s aphorism: “All commitment is ambivalent, since it is at one and the same time the affirmation and the restriction of a liberty”); or they approach commitment from the perspective of rational action, an outlook that has in its turn produced some stimulating though ultimately inconclusive work – e.g. by Amartya Sen and Jon Elster –, but which is is liable to veer off in the direction of a narrow and arid technicality that avoids all reference either to the history of philosophy or to the existentialist paradox just mentioned.

This paper’s argument has three strands. First, our understanding of the rationality of what we might call “iterated choice” has much to gain from a careful reading of Aristotle’s use of the concepts of prohairesis (Nicomachean Ethics II, iv-vi and III, ii; see also Segvic 2008; Bobzien 2014; Allen 2010; Chamberlain 1984; Kenny 1977; Charles 1984) and akrasia (EN, VII; see also Elster 2007; Elster and Loewenstein 1992; Pears 1984; Mele 2012; Stroud & Tappolet 2003). Secondly, an adequate consideration of commitment must raise the question of the rationality of the ends of commitment, and thus reopen an unresolved quarrel between Aristotle and Hume (and indeed between Rawls and Ignatius of Loyola) on the role of reason in the determination of ultimate ends (involving among other things a dispute about the correct interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics III, 1112b, on which see Kolnai 1977). Finally, commitment lends itself, in a way that has been surprisingly underexploited, to the kind of “grammatical” treatment recommended by Wittgenstein in the “rule-following” sections of Philosophical Investigations (§§143-242 and passim) and involves taking sides, albeit in a nuanced way, on the controversy between the “individualist” and “collectivist” interpretations of these sections. Elizabeth Anscombe used Wittgenstein’s method to powerful effect in clarifying the conceptual complexity of intention; here the target is the clarification of the related but by no means identical concept of sustainable choice or commitment. An early attempt to do this for commitment was made by Peter Winch (1958), and although in a later edition (1990) he repudiated a key thread of his
argument, his book remains an example of the way in which it is possible to establish connections between philosophy of mind and action and institutional rules and practices.

Ronan Sharkey has been teaching modern and contemporary philosophy (philosophy of language and mind, philosophy of action, as well as more specialised themes such as experience, intention and commitment) at the Catholic University of Paris since 2003. He also political theory at Sciences-Po. His main philosophical inspiration comes from Aristotle (specially the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics), Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Winch, Louis Dumont, Vincent Descombes, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor (especially his shorter writings and his recent Retrieving Realism), and Cora Diamond.

JOYCE ROOM

“Three Versions of Neoliberalism: Revolutionary Aristotelianism and Resistance” (John Gregson, Leeds Beckett University)

This paper connects contemporary analyses of neoliberalism with Alasdair MacIntyre’s broader critique of Liberal modernity. Interesting ideas have developed from both the neoliberalism-as-Ideology and neoliberalism-as-governmentality schools of thought—as wide-ranging and contested as these may be. Many interpretations accentuate the “neo” in neoliberalism in terms of its policies, general individualizing logic, and more specifically through concepts such as homo oeconomicus and resilience. What is often missing from such accounts is a more critical understanding of the conditions of liberal modernity that are conducive to the entrenchment of neoliberalism, and it is Macintyre who helps us understand this. Perhaps more importantly, contemporary literature recognizes neoliberalism as complex, contradictory and far from the monolithic, hegemonic ideology that it is has often been made out to be. The suggestion is that such contradictions can perhaps best be turned into resistance at a more localized level which again invites a connection with MacIntyre through his revolutionary Aristotelianism.

John Gregson lectures in Criminology at Leeds Beckett University. His research interests broadly intersect around Marxism, critical Criminology and neoliberalism. He is currently writing a chapter for a collaborative project focused on crime, mental health and the criminalization of the vulnerable in the neoliberal environment. His latest publication is a book examining Alasdair MacIntyre’s critical engagement with Marxism, entitled Marxism, Ethics & Politics: The work of Alasdair MacIntyre.
Friday, July 26, 2019
Concurrent Session 3 | 9-10:30 a.m.

CARMICHAEL ROOM

“A Philosophical Investigation of Seligman’s Psychological Flourishing via MacIntyre’s Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry” (James Barge, Eastern University; Kirk Mensch, University of Exeter; Amir St. Clair, Aurora University)

This proposal serves to introduce the early stages in development of an instrument, as part of the dissertation process, to measure an individual organization leader’s propensity toward the three rival versions of moral enquiry that MacIntyre (1990) argues exist today in significant conflict with one another. Tradition, with authoritative voices and texts driving moral enquiry in community originating with the ancient Greeks and developed more fully by Thomas Aquinas, suffered setbacks with the onset of the Reformation and the Enlightenment but has re-entered the conversation with MacIntyre’s voice in the last 30 years (Morgan, 2008; Mensch & Barge, 2018). Ushering in the notion of universal objective truths, the Encyclopedists offered a rival version that relegated traditional moral authority to the past and attempted to solve morality one accumulated fact at a time (Kinghorn, 2011; MacIntyre, 1990). While not successful, they live on, albeit in conflict, with the normative ethics of deontology and utilitarianism of today (Gofrey & Lewis, 2018). Nietzsche offered genealogy and perspectivism, in particular, as a pointed response to the notion of universal truth arguing that truth is only valid from an individual’s perspective and any attempt to force broad moral truths onto society is simply an attempt at power and subjugation (MacIntyre, 1990, Allen, 2017, Hibbs, 1993). His efforts laid the groundwork for the moral relativists and emotivists that thrive today as well (Solomon, 2003). These three camps of moral enquiry vie for our affections and intellects.

Organizational leaders have been shown to make moral decisions based on their individual moral philosophies and while scholars have developed and offered instruments to assess these underlying philosophies, for the most part, they have been limited to measuring normative ethical positions and some aspects of moral relativism (Shultz and Brender-Ilan, 2004; Davis, Andersen, & Curtis, 2001; Forsyth, 1992; Fernando & Chowdury, 2010). They lack the depth and breadth needed to completely assess an organizational leader’s moral grounding given the existence of three distinct camps of moral enquiry, including traditionalism and the extended voices of genealogy (relativism and emotivism) that exist today. This gap can be addressed by developing an instrument based on a deep literature review surrounding these three versions of moral enquiry and the creation of a set of characteristics and subsequent statements that accurately represent each version and therefore the leaders who hold these philosophies. MacIntyre himself encourages empirical work in the pursuit of moral philosophy and the ability to quantitatively understands one’s own propensity and that of others lends itself to richer dialogue and the potential for better solutions for moral dilemmas and decisions (Robson, 2015). Therefore, this proposal serves to introduce these characteristics and
statements for review and feedback by the field of experts in MacIntyre’s work and moral philosophy in general expected to attend the conference.

James L. Barge is a PhD candidate in the Organizational Leadership Program at Eastern University. James has worked in the aerospace industry for the last twenty years as a quality and process improvement leader. He earned a B.A. in chemistry from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an MBA from Xavier University in Cincinnati. His dissertation research is focused on the development of an instrument to assess how individual leaders' moral philosophies align with McIntyre's three rival versions of moral inquiry.

Kirk Mensch is a former associate professor of business and current adjunct and dissertation chair, having taught courses ranging from the philosophy and psychology of leadership to advanced quantitative methods. He spent over twenty years in public service working primarily within the U.S. intelligence community and began his academic career as an assistant professor at the College of William & Mary. He holds a BS in economics, an MBA, and two PhDs. His research centers in moral psychology, a discipline at the intersection of psychology and ethics.

Amir St. Clair is the Assistant Vice President/Director of Wackerlin Center at Aurora University in Aurora, IL, with primary responsibilities overseeing the university's leadership, service, and campus ministry programming along with emergency operations. His academic and scholarship interests include normative and moral ethics, servant leadership, and group work theory. He earned a BA in Religious Studies and Philosophy from St. Norbert College, a Master’s in Leadership Studies from North Central College, and is currently pursuing a PhD in Organizational Leadership from Eastern University.

“Vulnerability and Stakeholder Deliberation” (Robert Couch, Earlham College)

Despite MacIntyre's critique of capitalism, MacIntyreans have gone to great lengths to apply MacIntyre's practice-institution (Moore, 2005; Moore & Beadle 2006) framework to contemporary organizations, arguing that business firms can be understood as institutions housing productive practices. Beyond this focus on productive practices, some attention has been focused on deliberative governance practices within organizations (Bernacchio & Couch, 2015). Whereas MacIntyreans have largely focused on intra-firm questions, other scholars have drawn upon Habermas's discourse ethics to outline the role of deliberation within the firm's larger political environment (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). However, little attention has been given by MacIntyreans to this larger political context of the firm, or the role of the virtues in promoting the common good in this context.

In order to address this question, we draw upon and extend recent work based on Dependent Rational Animals to explain the nature of vulnerability and dependence within organizational contexts (Bernacchio, 2018). Following Nicholas (2012), we argue that Habermas’s discourse ethics lacks the
substantive content needed to overcome differential power relations between competing stakeholder interests. In contrast, MacIntyre's account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence, when applied to the politically fraught relationship between the firm and its stakeholders, provides a substantive account of the goods needed by stakeholders that is adequate to ensure meaningful deliberation.

Robert Couch is assistant professor of Global Management at Earlham College, where he teaches classes in finance, business ethics, and social entrepreneurship. His research focuses on questions pertaining to corporate governance and business ethics from a critical Aristotelian perspective.

“MacIntyre and the MacIntyreans on Investment Advising” (Daniel Sportiello, University of Mary)

In his “Irrelevance of Ethics,” Alasdair MacIntyre argues that investment advisors are inevitably vicious. However, not all of those inspired by MacIntyre admit this; some go so far as to argue that investment advising is a practice—and so, done rightly, it promotes virtue—while others argue merely that investment advising is not incompatible with virtue. In this essay, I examine three such arguments.

In his ambitious “Case for Investment Advising as a Virtue-Based Practice,” Keith Wyma argues that “positive liberty”—by which he seems to mean money—is a good internal to investment advising; in so doing, however, he relies on a serious misunderstanding of MacIntyre. In their equally ambitious “Characterizing Virtues in Finance,” Alejo Sison, Ignacio Ferrero, and Gregorio Guitián argue that investment advising is a matter of putting money to its “best use”—and so is not a matter of profits; in so doing, however, they rely on a serious misunderstanding of investment advising. Finally, in their less ambitious “Can a Good Person be a Good Trader? An Ethical Defense of Financial Trading,” Marta Rocchi and David Thunder argue not that investment advising is a practice but merely that an investment advisor can—at its margins—do what is virtuous; while they are right, this proves less than they seem to assume.

Or so I argue. In the course of my argument, I explain what I take to be the heart of the objection to investment advising made by MacIntyre. First, investment advisors must cultivate imprudence—that is, they must not ask whether the gain of money in the short term means the loss of money in the long term. And, second, this means that they must cultivate cowardice—that is, they must work to have others bear those losses. Given the plausibility of this objection, it seems that MacIntyre is right to worry that ethics is worse than irrelevant to investment advising!

Daniel Sportiello is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Mary in North Dakota. He earned his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Notre Dame in 2015. Prior to this, he won two teaching awards and
served as a Graduate Fellow at the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study. In his research, he is interested in the ways that ethics intersects with other subfields of philosophy. He is also interested in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eric Voegelin, and others.

**SALON C, SMITH BALLROOM**

“What Kind of Speech Is Narrative in MacIntyre’s Narratives?” (Gregory Beabout, Saint Louis University)

In his essay, “The ends of life, the ends of philosophical writing,” MacIntyre gestures toward a “yet to be established genre” of writing that he calls the “history of philosophers”. MacIntyre claims that writers of such histories in this new genre (along with traditional biographies of philosophers) “would do well to attend to the relationship in the life of each philosopher between her or his mode of philosophical speech and writing and her or his attitude towards questions about the ends of life”.

MacIntyre wrote narratives in this “yet to be established genre”, exploring with his reader the relationship between a person's writing and that writer's life. For example, in a compressed way, MacIntyre discusses in this same essay the writings and life of John Stuart Mill, of Thomas Aquinas, of Franz Rosenzweig, and of Georg Lukacs. In much greater detail, this is the question that motivates MacIntyre in his book on Edith Stein, where MacIntyre brings into focus important differences in this regard between Stein and Martin Heidegger.

The four narratives in the final chapter of *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity* (none of which tell the history of a philosopher) examine something quite similar: Grossman, O’Connor, James, and Faul are each writers and communicators, of one sort or another, whose life narratives exhibit a story of development in the relationship in the life of each between his or her speech/writing/communication and his or her attitude towards questions about the ends of life.

Aristotle, in Book I of the *Rhetoric*, examines the excellences internal to the practice of public speaking by distinguishing between three kinds of speeches: the deliberative speech (in which a community gathers to consider a future policy or proposal), the ceremonial speech (in which a community gathers to praise or blame the character of one of its members), and the courtroom speech (in which a community gathers to hold accountable one of its members). Further, Aristotle proposes that a particular type of reasoning is best suited to the persuasive purposes of each kind of speech. It is sensible that deductive reasoning is best suited in court, and that inductive reasoning is best for persuasive deliberation about future policies or elections. However, it is less obvious that Aristotle proposes a sort of narrative reasoning appropriate to the ceremonial speech.
Drawing from the work of Eugene Garver, I draw out features of the sort of narrative reasoning proposed by Aristotle as best suited for the ceremonial (epideictic) speech. Then, suggesting that MacIntyre’s narratives are akin to the kinds of speech examined by Aristotle in Book I, chapter 9 of the *Rhetoric*, I explore the role of imitation in epideictic narratives and the sort of reasoning suited to examining the complex relationship between what we say and how we live.

**Gregory R. Beabout is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University, where he has been on the faculty for 30 years. He has published widely in ethics, Catholic social thought, and Kierkegaard. An active member of the International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry for more than a decade, he hosted, with Ruth Groff, the 2015 ISME meeting at Saint Louis University. His book, The Character of the Manager: From Office Executive to Wise Steward, engages extensively with MacIntyre’s moral philosophy, as do many of his published articles. With Alejo Sison, he is associate editor of the two-volume work, Virtue Ethics in Business and Management.**

**“MacIntyre and Catholic Secondary Education: Evaluating Narrative, Telos, and Intentional Practices” (Lillian King, University of South Florida)**

It is no surprise to anyone interested in this conference that Alasdair MacIntyre, in the momentous wake of Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy,” has essentially created the field of contemporary Neo-Aristotelianism. Ripples of MacIntyre’s thought can be found in a wide variety of interdisciplinary discussions—from legal studies to biomedical and professional ethics. I wish to suggest one fresh domain that ought to consider the MacIntyrean framework, one outside the realm of the abstract or the ivory tower: Catholic secondary institutions. Though an obvious site for practical implementation of MacIntyre’s project, virtually no work has been done in this area save a few articles over the course of decades.\(^1\) However, as recent drama at the 2019 Pro-Life March uncomfortably revealed, perhaps moral formation at Catholic institutions should be revisited and re-evaluated. It is the goal of this paper to affirm that there a difference between teaching Catholic morals and building Catholic character; MacIntyre can help educators at Catholic schools understand this difference.

I will be focusing on three themes of MacIntyre’s work and how they pertain to Catholic secondary schools: narrative, *telos*, and intentional practices. I believe these themes will help shed light on what Catholic secondary schools believe themselves to be in the abstract and what they are practically speaking—the dissonance between formal mission statements and the student mold taking shape on the day to day. I argue that this dissonance has two main causes. First, schools employ a theological pedagogy reminiscent of the Early Modern project MacIntyre critiques: an emphasis on teaching
principles and enforcing duties to the faith rather than cultivation of holy desires and practices ordered to a Christian telos. Second, true Catholic formation is challenged by the secular drive for economic success and the centrality of “college-prep,” which have both silently been rewriting the narrative of Catholic secondary schools and have derailed any clear, communal telos. As a result, daily practices have become ambiguous, blurring the true mission and purpose of Catholic education. In effect, secular culture has usurped the narrative. Eradicating this dissonance between mission and mold requires declaring an explicit telos, intentionally re-writing the narrative of Catholic institutions, and faithfully establishing practices and procedures that align with such a Christian telos and narrative.

Lily King is a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida, studying medieval philosophy and virtue ethics under the supervision of Thomas Williams. Her dissertation is on Peter Abelard and the role of intention in his ethics. Throughout the duration of her graduate studies, she has presented at annual meetings of the Catholic Theological Society, the Midwest Division of the American Academy of Religion, the Society for Women in Philosophy, the New College Conference for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, and will present her work on Abelard to the UK Medieval Philosophy Organization in 2019.

“Recapturing Education: The Role of Enculturation in Moral Formation” (Anthony Halstead)

As education continues to be redefined in terms of technical training in relation to a career path, it is easy to lose sight of its crucial role in the moral formation of the human person. That is, the role of education is increasingly being seen as a means of producing competent workers rather than virtuous people. With this crisis in the educational system of our times, it appears that institutions of learning run the risk of being disconnected from moral discourse altogether. To solve this, a new philosophy of education is needed, one that recaptures the insights of what is being lost, insights once held by the ancient Greeks, the Scholastics, and the Neo-Scholastic thinkers. It is the contention of this argument that, while a clear, comprehensive, and practical understanding of what constitutes virtue is necessary for the moral formation of students, what is more important is an explicit and active form of enculturation in the classroom. In the approach of enculturation, the development of virtue is inherent, but this approach also imparts to the student a strong sense of time, place, and belonging to a community, which is the place in which he will practice his virtue best. To demonstrate this, the nature of virtue itself shall be discussed, drawing from the insights of Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph Pieper. Next, the nature of enculturation shall be explained, along with an argument for its central role in education, via the observations and critiques presented by Christopher Dawson. Third, a few models of education that succeed neither in enculturating their students nor instilling virtue shall be briefly examined. The conclusion shall be that the strong sense
of belonging within a given time, place, and people are absolutely crucial to the practice of virtue in everyday life.

Anthony Halstead is a graduate student studying philosophy at the Franciscan University of Steubenville, in Steubenville, Ohio. He achieved his Bachelors of Arts in Humanities with a minor in Economics at Franciscan University of Steubenville in 2017, where he received recognition for completing the Honors (Great Books) Program. During his time at Franciscan University, he developed a strong background in Thomism, along with a working knowledge in phenomenology and personalism.