The Philosophical Failure of Theological Determinism
Patrick Todd, Baylor University
Introduction and General Overview
In Christian philosophical and theological circles, few subjects
are debated with more rigor than the issue of God's sovereignty and human
free will. The approaches to the topic are many and varied. This paper
is my attempt to enter the dialogue. I present my principle philosophical
reason for rejecting one understanding of God's sovereignty which
I call theological determinism. In addition I will try to anticipate and
respond to several possible objections to my argument.
For this paper, theological determinism is the view that God predestined the course of the universe in exhaustive detail, and the world is unfolding according to a plan which God determined prior to creation. God's exhaustive control over the universe precludes the possibility of any of its events being otherwise. Given God's will, no events in the universe could have happened differently, and no future events will happen contrary to God's will. In addition, ‘determined system' or ‘determined universe' means the sum total of all the events which God has determined.
When we make the statement, “everything is predetermined,” we ourselves are included in the ‘everything' of which we speak. Similarly, when we say, “God's will causes all things,” our lives, and this statement, lie inside ‘all things' — they are but some of the things He has determined. Thus all statements in favor of theological determinism are reflexive back towards the person making the statement. We are supposed to be a part of the universe which God has determined. At this point it becomes interesting to ask how one knows that she is in a determined system. It is my contention that any possible response will be made as if she were outside the determined system, when she, according to her own view, is simply a member contained within it. Theological determinists claim to know about the nature of the universe from a position inside the system which precludes the possibility of this knowledge. Hence, theological determinism breaks down at the problem of knowledge; theological determinism cannot be known. The problem with theological determinism is that everyone who argues for it exempts his or her own thought from the determined universe about which he or she speaks.
To show this I will first present two analogies which I take to be illustrative of how the theological determinist stands inside the determined system, after which I will move to a more formal argument. Then I will attempt to answer what I anticipate to be a common objection to my argument: that we know about the determined system based on God's revelation of it to us. I also address whether exhaustive divine foreknowledge is a viable alternative to theological determinism, concluding that that fails and is tantamount to theological determinism. Last, I investigate the nature of self-refuting reflexive statements in an attempt to clarify and extend the argument.
Picture-thinking
Imagine a series of persons of equal height[1]
who inexplicably wake up to find themselves in a peculiar position. In
fact, they are in a straight line, locked in place and unable in any way
to turn around or step out of line. They are, however, able to communicate
with only one other person either directly in front of or behind them
in line. Now imagine that one of these unfortunate people, P, begins to
say to another, T, that they are in a line which must extend for a thousand
miles. We should not be surprised if T immediately questions the grounds
for P's knowledge, seeing that P would simply be a member in the supposed
line. How should P, if he is in the line, know anything about the line,
or that there is a line at all? To see that there is a series
of such persons, one must stand outside the line itself. A member inside
the line lacks sufficient perspective from which to describe the line.
T would be entirely justified in telling P that he lacks the conditions
for knowing about the line, if there is a line at all.
In the following visual, persons P and T cannot see the line. Person S, standing outside the line, can.
---------------------------------------P,T---------------------------------------
S
Persons P and T can of course speculate that they are in a line; they cannot, of themselves, know that they are. For P to make the claim that he does know is for P to presuppose that he is outside the line,[2] and if he is not, T is justified in treating P's claims as nonsense.
For the theological determinist to speak about the determined system which he is inside is like person P speaking about the line in which he stands. The theological determinist, as a being inside the determined system, would lack the necessary perspective in regards to the system to justifiably speak about the system, just as person P lacks the necessary perspective on the line to speak about the line. Neither stands in proper relation to the supposed object of their description such that they could, in fact, describe it. As P could of course speculate that he is in a line, so could (and so, I think, does) the theological determinist speculate that he is in a determined system. But for the theological determinist to know about the determined system, he must stand outside it in order to see that it exists. And since all human beings are in the system and the theological determinist is a human being, the theological determinist cannot know about the system. Thus theological determinism cannot be known.
Consider another analogy: A novel is a system of events determined by the novelist, and I can see and evaluate the novelist's 'system' (or book) because I stand outside it – I am not a character in the book itself. But a character in the novelist's book cannot come to know that she is in a book and evaluate her position in the novelist's story. Characters in a novel cannot know they are in a novel. They cannot read their own story, so to speak. Of course the novelists' friend can read the book given that he stands outside the story. With his outside perspective he can know about his friend's system of events called a novel.
In the same way in which characters in a novel cannot know of the novel, we cannot know that we are in a determined universe. Saying we are beings in a determined system, in a sense, is just to suppose that we are characters in a novel. Making the claim that we do know necessarily places us outside the system looking on, exactly the place we are not and cannot go. The knowledge that there is a script being ‘played out' presupposes being outside the script. In our case, we are supposed to be inside. One can only come to know about a script oneself is not in, and since we are all ‘in' the script, there is no way we can make a viable claim to know about it.
Some may object, “But a character in a novel can know he is in a novel simply if the novelist writes the book such that the character knows he is in a book. Likewise we can know we are in a determined universe if God determined that we know it.” This objection, however, cannot be construed as evidence that theological determinism is true, only possible. There is no evidence-giving in a theological determinist saying that his knowing about the system must itself be determined. His knowledge, on this view, must be determined because all things are determined. But why suppose that all things are determined? This objection assumes the truth of theological determinism and works backwards from this assumption when the question is whether theological determinism is true.
It is rather like my arguing for the existence of an invisible and unperceivable cat in the corner chair.[3] I can of course assert its existence. And when you (rightly) say, “Well I at any rate don't see or perceive the cat,” I am ready to say, “Well that is just what we should expect if the cat is invisible and unperceivable.” This is fine so long as I can establish by some other criteria that there is in fact a cat. And if I cannot, I take it as clear that I will not have been very convincing. I have not offered any evidence for belief in the cat, and no evidence seems possible. Likewise the theological determinist must establish on some other grounds that theological determinism is true before asserting that he knows this because it was determined that he know it. And as I have argued, the only grounds from which the theological determinist can claim to know about the determined system are outside the system. If no grounds are possible, the theological determinist is not at all convincing. So theological determinism remains possible, but impossible to prove; it is possible that God determined for people to know theological determinism, but grounds for demonstrating theological determinism are impossible. It is possible that there is a cat in the corner chair, but impossible to prove given its supposed characteristics.
The argument
We can now proceed to the argument itself. Someone arguing for
theological determinism must assume that he is sufficiently ontologically
distinct from the determined system in order to formulate the argument
that there is a determined system. He must assume that he is an 'I' over
against the 'it' of the universe; he must stand in relationship to it
such that he can justifiably call himself 'himself' and the universe 'the
universe.' One can only describe that which is sufficiently 'outside'
oneself such that an 'I-you' or 'I-it' relation obtains.[4]
A useful analogy can be observed in human eyesight. Let us suppose the
existence of a one-eyed man forever in solitary confinement in a room
without any minimally reflective surfaces. This man experiences the room
visually and can gather that there is something by virtue of which he
sees. Using his sense of touch, he can feel what we know to be
his eye. But can there be any doubt that this man can never see his
eye? His eye is that by virtue of which he sees; it itself cannot be seen.
He cannot describe his eye because of insufficient perspective. His eyesight
cannot get 'outside' the eye such that the eye can be described visually.
Thus he cannot describe his eye because the eye is not sufficiently outside
him. With determinism, we cannot get sufficiently 'outside' the determined
system to perceive in any way the nature of the system. We are, so to
speak, 'stuck' inside the determined scheme much as eyesight is 'stuck'
within the eye.
If, as the theological determinist asserts, all things are fully determined, then we are fully determined. Thus we have no adequate grounds for distinguishing ourselves from the determined universe. If theological determinism is true, whatever descriptions we offer of the universe are themselves only one of its necessary parts. Everything we do is fully explainable in terms of the determined system. We are not in a position to say what is and what is not part of the system, or what has been determined and what has not been determined. There can be then no statement about the determined universe from inside the determined universe that is itself not simply a function of the determined universe. Consequently we cannot make an ontological distinction between 'part of the determined universe' and 'not part of the determined universe.' Then, of course, there is no ontological separation between us and the determined universe such that an 'I-it' relation exists, and thus no way to speak of it — to call the system an 'it.' The theological determinist must suppose that our thoughts (at least sometimes) qualify as ‘not part of the determined universe' in order to account for how these thoughts could have addressed the determined universe as an other — as an 'it.' However, if theological determinism is true, then our thoughts are never ontologically ‘other than' the universe such that they can speak about the universe as an 'other.' We cannot describe something which is not an 'it' or a 'you' to describe. There is no relationship between us and the determined system. And we cannot describe that to which we do not stand in relation. There are therefore no adequate grounds for describing the determined universe for a being in the determined universe.
We can briefly sum up the argument as follows:
• To describe a thing, the thing must be an 'it' or 'you' to describe.
• Therefore, to describe the determined system, it must be an ‘it' to describe.
• For a thing to be an 'it' or a 'you' for the self, the self's thoughts (I) must stand over against the thing.
• Therefore, for the determined system to be an 'it' for the self, the self's thoughts (I) must stand over against it.
• Human beings, in a fully determined system, are fully determined.
• Therefore, for any given human being, none of his/her thoughts are separate from the determined system.
• Therefore, no thoughts of any human being in the system stand over against or distinct from the determined system.
• Therefore, no thoughts of any human being in the determined system can describe the determined system.
Is Revelation possible?
At this stage in the argument, most Christian theological determinists
might reply, “We have not come to know about God's exhaustive control
of the universe by simply thinking about it. God Himself revealed to us
in Scripture that the universe is entirely pre-determined.” If, however,
we are beings inside a determined universe, we do not qualify as beings
to which God could reveal anything even supposing He wanted to.
Revelation presupposes the existence and ontological separation of two
minds: one which has the information to be revealed, and another to receive
the information. For my mind to be distinct from God's it must think thoughts
which are not exhaustively caused by God's mind, in which case I think
thoughts which God has not caused. And thus God's mind is not the sole
determiner of all that is, which is the denial of the thesis of theological
determinism.
Here it will be helpful to revisit the prior analogy of a novelist. Can a novelist reveal information to her character inside her book? The question is whether this relationship is one in which information can go from one mind to another. But in this case the mind of the character is explainable fully in terms of the mind of the author. Hence there is no distinction of minds that the very idea of revelation presupposes. For revelation to obtain there must be two minds the thoughts of which cannot be fully explained in terms of the other. If a character has a separate mind from that of the author, the character ought to have the capacity to go on thinking of himself independently of the thought of the author. But it is clear that characters themselves are simply the thoughts of their authors, and thoughts do not think — thinkers think. Conversely, a novelist is quite able to reveal her book to her fellow novelist because this mind is ontologically distinct and thinks of itself apart from her own. Simply speaking, if we are beings capable of receiving revelation from God, we must be beings capable of some degree of self-determination in our thoughts. We must be, in some sense, thinkers 'on our own' apart from the thoughts of God. Without this qualification, we do not have minds in any proper sense, and thus there is no thing to which God can reveal information.
Consequently, one of the things which God reveals to us, if He reveals anything at all, cannot be that we are determined beings. If this were true, revelation would be impossible. The idea of God revealing to us that we are beings inside a universe which He has exhaustively determined thus suffers from self-referential incoherence. As soon as we claim that God revealed to us that we are beings in a determined system, we must also admit that we are then beings to which God could have revealed nothing. Saying that God told me that I am a being in His determined system is tantamount to saying that God told me that He cannot tell me anything. You can claim that God has revealed to you that you are in a system which He controls, but in doing so you eliminate the very distinction of minds which you presuppose when formulating your position, namely that this information was transferred from His mind to yours. According to the information which was supposedly transferred to your mind via revelation, you do not have a mind-proper at all.
The failure of exhaustive divine foreknowledge
Rather than saying, like the theological determinist, that before
the creation of the universe God predestined its course in exhaustive
detail, some say that God merely foreknew its course in exhaustive
detail. Is it possible that God foreknew the content of the universe without
determining it as such? I argue that it is not.
The problem with this view is that before creation, the contents of the universe must have existed in order for God to foreknow exhaustively. The entire content of the universe is ‘there' for God to know it perfectly. Even God knows only that which exists; God does not know that there is a penguin next to me, because there is not a penguin. And given that the entire content of the universe is in God's mind prior to unfolding through time, we must ask where this content came from if not from God. Who created that specific future which God knows perfectly?
The claim that God foreknows the future contents of the universe but does not cause it as such says that God simply ‘sees' the future as it will be. But what possible genesis can be given for this content that God sees, when prior to the creation of the universe there was only God and no other being to think it? In other words, God is the only possible source for all the content of the foreknown universe because, as seems obvious, prior to creation, there is nothing else.
We could, on the other hand, deny that God created the future as He foreknew it to be. It could just exist. But if a thing is not created by God, yet exists, it was not created at all, but exists by virtue of itself. The claim that God only 'sees' the future may thus collapse into dualism: for now we are admitting the self-existence of both God and the-universe-as-it-will-be. God has not created the-universe-as-it-will-be and simply finds himself co-eternal with it, perfectly perceiving its contents and perfectly knowing the future. Of course, demonstrating the philosophical shortcomings of such a dualism is unnecessary for any Christian to whom its theological shortcomings are abundant and obvious. No one, quite rightly, can accept such a view of God as a co-eternal, not eternally the basis of all Being, but simply one being amongst another or others. So if God foreknows the content of the universe prior to creation, it is by virtue of the fact that he determined it to be as such. There are no other options. No being could have caused it to exist in God's mind, because there are yet no other beings. And it could not be co-eternal with God. Consequently, exhaustive divine foreknowledge is tantamount to theological determinism, and the same earlier conclusions apply.
Reflexivity
My argument centers on the idea that there is a kind of reflexivity
involved with theological determinism, and that this feature of theological
determinism condemns it. What is the nature of self-defeating reflexive
statements, and what do pro-theological determinism statements have in
common with them?
It is first necessary to fill out the concept of a reflexive statement as I have conceived it in this paper. I am not prepared, nor do I think it is crucial for my purposes, to give the necessary and sufficient conditions of reflexive statements, such that a statement is reflexive if and only if it meets the specified conditions. Nonetheless I think we can come to an adequate conception of a reflexive statement such that we can recognize their instantiation. So what are some distinguishing features about reflexive statements that will help us recognize them?
The primary way to identify reflexive statements is the feature of the speaker's/subject's inclusion in the category of things to which he attributes some particular characteristic. “Men born in July are liars” is reflexive if it turns out that the speaker is a man born in July. He is included in the category of things (crudely conceived) to which he is attributing the characteristic of being liars.
This concept applies not just with the speakers of sentences but with the non-personal subject of sentences as well. For instance, someone may decide to say, “All true statements are necessarily true.” Call this sentence 'sentence P'. If by making this statement this person wants to say something true, sentence P should fall into the category of “all true statements.” Thus sentence P attributes necessary truth to itself, because it attributes necessary truth to all true statements, and P is (or is supposed to be) a true statement.
Not all reflexive statements are automatically false. There are, of course, an infinite number of possible reflexive statements that are true. One such would be “All human beings with brown hair are human beings.” If the speaker is a human being with brown hair, he is included in the category of things to which he is attributing the property of being a human being, and the statement is true, if only a tautology.
My contention concerning theological determinism is that it is self-refuting. If certain conditions are met, some reflexive statements undercut themselves. Consider the following well known philosophical example: Logical positivists were known to assert that “all cognitively meaningful sentences are either analytic or synthetic.” I will name this sentence 'sentence Q'. Critics have pointed out that this sentence itself is neither analytic nor synthetic, and consequently the sentence does not meet its own criteria for cognitive meaning.[5] Unless the logical positivist does not consider her own sentences to be cognitively meaningful, she will consider the specified sentence Q to fall under the category of “all cognitively meaningful sentences.” Thus sentence Q attributes itself with the property of being either analytic or synthetic. But sentence Q is neither analytic nor synthetic. Hence sentence Q is not in the category of “all cognitively meaningful sentences” or all cognitively meaningful sentences are not analytic or synthetic. So either sentence Q is cognitively meaningless or it is wrong about the nature of cognitively meaningful sentences. In either case the sentence is self-refuting. If one has access to the relevant concepts in the sentence, one can detect its problem without external appeal.
Take the more intuitive case of a person who bursts into a classroom claiming to have proved that all proofs are invalid.[6] The conclusion to his proof is “all proofs are invalid.” But his proof is a proof, and thus included in the category “all proofs.” Thus he attributes invalidity to his own proof. If all proofs are invalid, the proof that all proofs are invalid is invalid. It is clear that no one could ever prove that all proofs are invalid. At most one could hope to prove that all other proofs are invalid.
Thus there is a kind of conditionality in self-defeating reflexive statements. If it were true that all cognitively meaningful sentences were analytic or synthetic, this sentence would not be cognitively meaningful. If all proofs are invalid, the proof that all proofs are invalid is invalid. The conditionality involved with theological determinism is understandably more complex. “Everything is determined” undercuts itself because if everything were determined, it would be impossible for the speaker to know everything was determined. The knowledge that “everything is determined” necessitates that one does not fall into the category of “everything.” But in theological determinism all human beings are in the determined system (the ‘everything'), and theological determinists are human beings. Thus pro-theological determinism statements have the characteristic feature of reflexive statements. The speaker is included in the category of things (everything) which he or she is attributing the property of being determined. And pro-theological determinism statements, albeit in a more complex manner, display the conditional feature of other self-refuting reflexive statements: if the speaker is in the category of things attributed with being determined, the speaker could not have knowledge about which he or she speaks.
Conclusion
My argument is that theological determinism is self-referentially
incoherent. As beings fully encapsulated by the determined system which
they postulate, theological determinists would lack the requisite perspective
on the determined system to come to know that they are beings inside of
it. Knowledge about a determined system entails a standpoint outside the
system, as knowledge of a novel entails a standpoint outside the novel.
Some theological determinists claim to know that they are members of a
determined universe based on revelation. Though this paper does not address
whether Christian Scripture supports a deterministic view, or what authority
it should be given, the idea of revelation presupposes the ontological
separation of two minds, and thus presupposes non-determinism. I conclude
that theological determinism cannot be known.
[1] This condition ensures
that no person in the line is so tall as to see the line over the tops
of everyone's heads. In fact, the only thing anyone in this situation
could see is the back of the following person's head.
[2] It is true that S,
who can know about the line, could inform P that he is in a line. This
objection will be dealt with below in the section, “Is Revelation Possible?”
[3] This image is C.S.
Lewis' in a non-related discussion. See “Friendship” in his book The
Four Loves.
[4] I am indebted
to Martin Buber for these terms, though they are employed in a fundamentally
different manner.
[5] My point here is not
to attack logical positivism, but only to use this statement as an example.
Whether 'sentence Q' is analytic or synthetic is not my concern; I think
it is not, but here I am just assuming that it is not.
[6] This example is also
attributable to C.S. Lewis. See his essay Bulverism in “God in
the Dock.”
