A couple of weeks ago I gave a talk on Catholics and voting to a Catholic student group at George Mason University. In the course of discussing some of the bishops' recent statements, especially Cardinal McCarrick's "interim reflections" for the Task Force on Catholic Bishops and Catholic Politicians," there was a good bit of discussion of what was meant by "proportionate reasons." Given the continued controversy about abortion and voting, it seems to me worth thinking a bit more about what might constitute a "proportionate" reason to counter the general presumption against voting for candidates who favor abortion rights. What I offer below is only notes towards the sort of thinking required and I'd be very happy to hear what others think about the matter. Recall first Cardinal McCarrick's statement, evidently informed by advice from Rome:

It is important to note that Cardinal Ratzinger makes a clear distinction between public officials and voters, explaining that a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil only if he were to deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candidate's permissive stand on abortion. However, when a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted if there are proportionate reasons.

So what is needed to justify a vote for a candidate who supports abortion rights is (a) that one not vote for that candidate because of his or her support for abortion rights and (b) a proportionate reason. "Proportionate" would seem to indicate, if not equality, at least approximation. That is, the good one aims to secure by voting for a candidate who supports abortion rights should at least approximate the abortion-related evils that his or her election would entail. So one must consider both of these types of effect.

I think there are two relatively uncontroversial cases. The first is one where the office in question has no direct jurisdiction over abortion and abortion-related matters of policy. Imagine a race for city council where it emerges (that it would may seem odd, but let us grant it for argument's sake) that one candidate is pro-abortion rights and one candidate is opposed to abortion rights. However, the city council has no jurisdiction over abortion and the first candidate has views about local taxes, street maintenance, and the running of the public library that one supports and where one disagrees with the other candidate on all these issues. It seems perfectly reasonable to vote for the first candidate in this case. The other relatively (though, perhaps somewhat less) uncontroversial case would consider a race, say for governor, where both candidates are in favor of abortion rights. Here more circumstances come into play (e.g., the composition of the state legislature and the current law on abortion in that state), however, it still seems reasonable that in many cases one might vote for either candidate depending on the other issues at stake in the election and thus vote for a candidate who supports abortion rights.

What other examples of proportionate reason can one imagine? Consider a case like the following: one candidate is in favor of abortion rights and may well have some say over the matter once in office; the other candidate is a xenophobic nativist whose speeches are regularly laced with antisemitism and other forms of racism, but who is nevertheless vehemently pro-life. This may seem highly unusual, but I believe conscientious pro-life voters in some European countries have faced such a choice. One can imagine a David Duke-like candidate in a U.S. election filling the second role. Would the quasi-fascist alternative in this case constitute a proportionate reason to vote for the pro-abortion candidate? I think one could reasonably conclude that it may. One can imagine conscientious pro-life voters joining a 1930s style popular front against fascism or quasi-fascism if the fascist candidate had a real chance to win and one has reason to expect him to act on his principles.

But what about more ordinary dilemmas? What if the anti-abortion candidate is in favor of the death penalty? To some extent this would depend upon the office and the state of the law. While an American president could adopt a policy of regularly commuting the sentences of federal death row inmates, there are not many executions carried out by the federal government. There would seem little proportion here with the 1.3 million abortions that take place annually. Moreover, the Catholic teaching on the death penalty is not that it is always and everywhere wrong as is the case with abortion, but rather that where the protection of society does not require it the death penalty should not be used. But that seems like the sort of prudential judgment best made by legislators properly equipped to make such a determination. The same can be said with respect to many other policy matters, including decisions about going to war.

In addition to such considerations one should evaluate the precise attitude of a politician who supports abortion rights as among the proportionate reasons in play. One can imagine a politician who starts with the view that given the disagreement over abortion and the legal regime that has been in place for three decades he or she does not feel able to impose his or her "personal" values on the whole country, but goes on to strongly resolve to do everything possible to discourage abortions in various ways, e.g., informed consent and parental consent laws, much expanded social policies aimed at discouraging abortion including extensive funding of crisis pregnancy centers, etc. In addition the candidate resolves to use the presidency as a platform to make the moral case against abortion and not to insist that abortion be funded with tax money or that medical research entailing the destruction of human embryos be funded with tax money. Such a candidate would not appear at pro-abortion rallies, nor would he or she criticize opponents for threatening to "take away choice," nor would she make support for Roe v. Wade a conditio sine qua non for nomination to the federal bench. Such a candidate would see this position as a sad compromise with a sadder reality. This is not the bishops' view, nor is it mine, but I think it would be a morally serious view and, conscientiously held, might well contribute to the eventual elimination of legal abortion. This sort of attitude, combined with other factors, such as the policies of the opposing candidate, could perhaps contribute to the sorts of proportionate reasons proposed by Cardinal Ratzinger. One does not have to connect too many dots, however, to see that this view is a far cry from that of Senator Kerry.