In an earlier post, "Sacred Monkeys," I described the crucial importance of prudence in our lives as we consider the coming election. I pointed out that prudence is the virtue of judgment by which we integrate in our actions other virtues, generally justice, temperance, and courage. More particularly, it is the habit of integrating these virtues while adapting appropriate means to good ends; it is a habitual kind of moral success in adapting those good means to those good ends. It has its place in evaluating the good circumstances in which and the good goals for which one proposes to engage in an act good in its kind. I also pointed out that there is no prudence involved in an act that is bad in its kind, for example adultery, rape, and so on. Prudence can be considered with regard to our own particular lives, or with regard to our lives as part of the common good. In the first case, it is personal prudence, in the second it is political prudence. Perfect prudence concerns the whole or integral good of human life, one's personal good and the common good integrally related in pursuit of ultimate human fulfillment.

However, it is also crucially important to recognize that a necessary condition for possessing prudence, personal or political, is that one recognizes and only pursues goals, personal or political, that are good in their kind. I thought it might be useful to consider aspects of Thomas Aquinas' general discussion of prudence in order to understand this point, even though he does not address democracy and voting directly in that discussion. Aquinas is certainly not the last word in moral and political philosophy or theology, though just as certainly he is a good starting point. Indeed, he may be a very good point to catch up with. Certainly within the context of Catholic discussion of these issues, he plays a heavy role, and in some respects relevant to today his analysis is stark. According to Aquinas, one can fall short of perfect prudence, personal or political, in at least two ways. One way he calls a kind of imperfect prudence, the other false prudence. Imperfect prudence is "true prudence" and yet it may be imperfect according to Aquinas because of two quite different reasons. On the one hand it may be in pursuit of a genuine but limited good simply. On the other hand it may recognize genuine goods as goals, and yet fail to be successful in adapting means to those goals, or to correctly integrate the other virtues in pursuit of those goals. The first type of imperfect prudence is not a failure of prudence, while the second is. Marital prudence, no matter how well one engages in it in pursuit of the good of sexual relations, is a kind of imperfect prudence in the first sense because it does not bear upon the whole of the integral human good, but, rather, a part. So also for prudence in one's job, or friendships, and so on. There is no failure of prudence here, however imperfect it may be, and thus no error in one's acts.

On the other hand, if one mistakenly takes any one of these limited goods, or many of them together, as the whole of the integral human good to the exclusion of others there is a failure of prudence, and one will commit error even as one pursues these goods. So there is a kind of imperfect prudence here as well. As I am certainly subject to error in my acts in many ways, imperfect prudence is the kind of prudence I ought to pray for, short of and as on the way toward acquiring perfect prudence. I have hope. I still recognize and pursue those things which are good in their kind, however much my pursuit of them is disordered. My hope then is that I can bring order into my pursuit of these genuine goods in kind, and thus aspire toward perfect prudence. Nonetheless, however imperfect, this remains prudence because the goods I am pursuing in disordered ways are genuine goods; as those good goals participate in goodness as such, so this prudence imperfectly participates in perfect prudence. At the level of political prudence in myself or my leaders, I ought to pray that we make good well ordered judgments in pursuit of genuine goods. If we do not, I ought to pray that we see the disorder in our pursuit of genuine goods, and correct them. But it is absolutely necessary that the political goals we pursue be policies involving acts good in their kind, for example health care, economic development, just wages, just war, punishment, and so on.

As I argued in my previous posting, there is no political prudence involved in the legitimation and promotion of acts bad in their kind, like torture, slavery, and abortion. Thus, by contrast, Aquinas describes what he calls "false prudence." It is called prudence because it resembles prudence in its ability to adapt means to an end; but it is called false because the end in view is in fact a goal bad in its kind. It is a matter of the appearance of prudence rather than the reality. "In this way a thief is called a good thief because he adapts means well to the end of thievery. It is this kind of prudence of which the Apostle says in Romans that the prudence of the flesh is death." (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q.47, a. 13) The use of 'good' here does not signify moral goodness, but mere success. It is not imperfect prudence because it is not genuine prudence at all. It is success in achieving a goal bad in its kind. In order to distinguish the kind of practical reasoning involved in true prudence, perfect or imperfect, from that in false prudence, following Aristotle Aquinas calls the latter "cunning" ("astutia"). So strictly speaking, if we want to avoid confusion, we should not say the thief is a good thief, but a cunning thief. In addition, Aquinas' account of false prudence suggests that it is not simply a failure of prudence with respect to this one goal. That would be imperfect prudence. No. It is a failure tout court to have true prudence with respect to any goods. One with this "false prudence" is not capable of discerning true goods from apparent goods. If perchance, he or she happens to hit upon a real good, it is not because of his or her capacity to recognize goods. He or she may achieve a good goal. But because of the lack of true prudence, it is just happenstance or per accidens. Most likely it will be a happenstance driven by selfish interest. The cunning agent reasons that it happens to be a key to success here and now to pursue this goal, good or bad. In one set of circumstances he or she will pursue the good involved in some goal, while in another set of circumstances he or she will act to destroy the good involved in that goal; in either case he or she is probably motivated by the desire for success in advancing his or her interests. In the case of a goal that happens to be a real good, he or she does not do so because of a recognition of its genuine goodness and thus a genuine willed desire for it as good. True goods become merely instrumental goods in service to apparent goods. This implication of Aquinas' discussion is stark indeed, for we do not want to think that we or others can appear to be doing good in pursuing a genuine good, and yet not be except per accidens. In false prudence the appearance of all of the other subordinate virtues that Aquinas describes as involved in true prudence will be nothing other than ersatz likenesses as well. In short there are two quite different ways to fail with regard to prudence, the failure of prudence which is imperfect disordered prudence, and the failure to have prudence which is false prudence or cunning.

Pursuit of a goal bad in its kind is evidence ipso facto that the one pursuing it does not have true prudence, which is why a different kind of practical rationality has to be attributed to such a one than is attributed even to imperfect badly ordered prudence. In order to recognize false prudence, in oneself or in another, one must show that the individual pursues goals that are bad in kind. In the case of political prudence, pursuit of a political goal bad in its kind is evidence that the one pursuing it does not have true political prudence. Thus, in order to show that some politician does not have true political prudence, but, rather, political cunning, one must show that he or she promotes policies that are bad in kind.

Aquinas' picture of false prudence is stark, which is why we ought to pray to have at least disordered imperfect prudence. But with these aspects of Aquinas' discussion of prudence in mind, what is there to be said about the necessity of voting? One ought to aspire to integral human fulfillment. Thus one ought to aspire to perfect prudence. But perfect prudence, bearing upon the integral human good, requires, among other things, judgments ordered toward protecting and promoting the common good of one's community. Generically, in any community there are many acts that political prudence must seek to order as means to the end of protecting and promoting the common good, integrating justice, temperance, and courage--generally committing one's time, energy, and goods (including even blogging!) to the good of others. And it is important to recognize that our commitment to the common good does not extend only as far as our shores. Aquinas writes, "by nature every human being stands as friend to every other human being with a kind of universal love; as Ecclesiasticus says, 'Every animal loves its kind.'" Notice that for Aquinas the basis for inclusion within the scope of this universal love and the justice that animates it is human nature itself. And yet, particular judgments will place greater emphasis upon the familial, and local in accord with the principle of subsidiarity. The ways in which we pursue these personal acts are all political acts in some sense.

However, specifically in a democracy like ours, we protect and promote the common good by electing those who would lead us locally and nationally. In addition to the particular policies promoted by a candidate for office, we should try to determine to what extent that candidate possesses political prudence. Most likely he or she will not possess perfect prudence. Who among us does? Indeed, insofar as the common good is not the whole of the integral human good, we need have no desire at all for one who has perfect prudence. As citizens, we are in no need of philosopher-kings. But we should look at least for imperfect political prudence. Ideally we should want a candidate who possesses imperfect and well ordered political prudence. But once again, who among us has this well ordered imperfect political prudence? Suppose the candidate possesses imperfect but disordered political prudence? With humility recognizing that sometimes we may in fact be wrong in our own judgments of political prudence when we disagree with him or her, still we can hope that when he or she fails to appropriately order good political means to good political ends, his or her judgment will improve precisely because he or she has true though imperfect political prudence. However much I may disagree with the particular practical judgments of a candidate, limited government does not involve acts bad in their kind (on the contrary, unlimited government violates the Church's teaching on the principle of subsidiarity); punishment, specifically the death penalty, does not involve acts bad in their kind; acts of war do not involve acts bad in their kind; the economic system of capitalism, according to the teaching of the Church, does not necessarily involve acts bad in their kind. I should think I would be happy if the failures of prudence I recognize in a candidate bear on such policies, however much I may disagree with them.

But what if a candidate does not possess even imperfect political prudence? We should vote against him or her unless we have a proportionate reason involving some greater harm that will follow upon voting against him or her. In which case we should vote for him or her in order to limit the greater evil. What evidence might we have that a candidate does not possess even imperfect political prudence, but, rather, false political prudence or cunning? Well, given Aquinas' discussion of prudence, it would be that the candidate advocates political policies that legitimate and promote acts or goals bad in their kind, like slavery, torture, abortion, euthanasia, and so on. Advocacy of such policies is, in the light of Aquinas' analysis, evidence ipso facto that such a candidate does not have true political prudence.

But suppose the candidates one is confronted with in a particular election all advocate some policy legitimating and promoting acts or goals bad in their kind, that is, all of the candidates have false prudence? In our own day, it often seems that cunning is not the exception in politics, but the warp and woof of it; we may be tempted to say "a pox upon both your houses," and refrain from voting at all. However, such a counsel of despair is shortsighted. This is not the first age nor will it be the last in which Christians have had to face difficult choices in politics, involving the toleration of evil goals. Walker Percy, when asked, "why are you a Catholic," responded that "the Catholic Church is a very good place for sinners to be, which is probably why there are so many of us in it." We all fail, and we all need each others' help in limiting the failures we are prone to, personal and political. We must pursue good to the extent that we can, and limit evil to the extent that we can. A desire to remain pure of the stain of politics in this vale of tears may tempt us to have nothing to do with a setting in which evil will take place no matter what we do. Then neither should we participate with one another in our families, our Churches, our sports, our schools, our committee meetings (especially our committee meetings!), our towns, and so on, in short, our lives. On the contrary, then we fall short of the duty to limit evil to the extent that we can. Failure to limit evil to the extent that one can becomes complicity in it. And it is the wisdom of the Church that quite often the limitation of evil will involve tolerating a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater one. In this regard there is nothing special about our own age.

Short of claiming that the entire political order of our democracy is itself the worst evil and danger to the common good, outweighing all others, something akin to Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, one must engage in the judgments of prudence that weigh toleration of lesser and greater evils, minimizing as much as possible the amount of damage that may occur. One cannot sit by and watch as a greater evil flourishes than might occur if one became engaged. One's own aspiration for perfect prudence would still imply that one must vote in order to limit the damage done to the common good. By not voting, one is making it easier for greater damage to be done to the common good than might otherwise occur. Not voting in such a situation is a failure in one's responsibility at least to protect, not to mention promote the common good in a democracy. It would be to abandon the aspiration to perfect prudence. To abandon the aspiration to perfect prudence is to abandon the aspiration to human flourishing. Indeed, insofar as one abandoned the aspiration to human flourishing, that is, the aspiration to the integral human good, one would at the very least be pursuing one limited aspect of the integral human good to the deliberate exclusion of another; thus one would be deliberately pursuing imperfect badly ordered prudence. Furthermore, Aquinas argues that one's own individual good is impossible without the common good. Thus failure to protect the common good, or at least to limit the damage done to it, is a failure to protect one's own good, or at least to limit the damage done to it.

If one will not take a stand even in failure against the greater evil, why would one take a stand against the lesser when the time comes? Even when there is no hope of immediate success, one's vote is a sign, however small, to one's fellow citizens and to one's leaders that one stands opposed to the greater evil being done. As Mother Theresa once said, "the Lord does not ask of me success. He asks of me faithfulness." Voting in a democracy to limit the damage done to the common good, even when one does not anticipate success, is a sign, however small, of faithhfulness to, and solidarity with one's neighhbors in the common good, particularly the weakest who more often than not directly suffer the evil. Without it, we envelope them in darkness. In that measure even a failed vote is a sign of hope for them. Not voting signifies nothing to them.

So one's own political prudence must judge in such a situation which candidate is promoting the proportionately lesser evil; voting for such a candidate is an effort to limit the damage to the common good. Particular judgments here may be very difficult, but it is antecedently improbable that there will be some kind of perfect equality in the harm done to the common good by the respective candidates. Here I would recommend the excellent discussion posted earlier on this blog (10/19/04) by Brad Lewis on "Proportionate Reasons." In particular, in my previous post I argued that given the fundamental role of innocent human life in the constitution of the common good, in our own day it is difficult to see that there is any proportionate evil that one may judge to be greater than policies that legitimate and promote the taking of human life in abortion and euthanasia, or as David and Brad have pointed out in earlier posts, the deliberate production and subsequent destruction of a human life solely to farm its parts out for the benefit of others. All the other goods that must be protected in the common good find their point and purpose in the flourishing of innocent human life. They are empty "values" subject to social whim, prejudice, and cunning when divorced from the fundamental good of human life itself. No doubt there will be many who with good will may disagree with me in that judgment. When I listen to the brighter angels of my nature, and avoid irascibility, the thought that one or other of us will be wrong does not inflame me. But, regardless, none of us can fail to act to limit the greater evil we judge to be pressing in upon us. If Aquinas' discussion is relevant to our day, prudence demands better of us.

"What do I want if I love someone else? I want him to be happy. In charity, Thomas says, we love others 'as companions in the sharing of beatitude.'"(Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation) On All Saints and the eve of All Souls, pray for our country, and those who would lead it, and "pray for me, as I will for thee, that we may all meet merrily in heaven."

John O'Callaghan
ndethics@nd.edu