

Christian Philosophy and Renewal of Catholic Intellectual Life  
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An important and lively set of debates took place in 1930s France motivated by the issue of Christian philosophy. These debates, and particularly certain positions articulated in the course of the debates are relevant to renewal of Catholic intellectual life in several ways. First, they provide glimpses into a different renewal of Catholic intellectual life, namely that of France in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Second, the positions articulated by certain interlocutors supply notions useful for thinking about and through renewal. Third, in a negative way, they enable us, as Catholics in present day America, to grasp what may be missing or partially lost in our intellectual forums, particularly in that of the university, specifically the Catholic university. Three disclaimers about this paper must be made from the start. First, my paper is motivated by the problematic situation of current Catholic intellectual life, but for brevity's sake and given the many other conference papers discussing aspects of this situation in detail, I intend to simply note this motivation and move on to discuss three philosophers' articulations of Christian philosophy. Second, although their positions bear implications for other disciplines, I stick to addressing that of philosophy. Third, I am not making the claim that renewal of Catholic intellectual life must by any necessity be thought through the positions on Christian philosophy in that debate, but the much weaker claim that considering those positions contributes in some small way both to thinking about renewal, and to actually carrying it out.

Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Gabriel Marcel were not the only major interlocutors in the Christian philosophy debate, but they were among the most important.<sup>1</sup> They are also probably the most familiar to an American audience, and their positions also have the virtue of being able to be arranged in a certain order of development. From Gilson, we can take

critiques of positions that held Christian philosophy to be impossible, and a conception of Christian philosophy locating it in both the past and the present. Maritain develops a position similar to Gilson's, but providing us with additional intellectual tools, particularly the notion of philosophy in a Christian state. Marcel indicates the centrality that the mystery of the Incarnation ought to have in Christian philosophy, and highlights the interpersonal condition of philosophy.

The issue at the start of the debate was whether there was, or could be any such thing as Christian philosophy. Addressing this question is not as simple as might appear at first. What it asks about is not the existence of Christians who are philosophers, nor the existence of philosophies labeled "Christian", but rather whether whatever was called Christian philosophy could be genuinely philosophical. The debate was from the start a normative one involving the very conception of philosophy, what was philosophically legitimate, and the relations between reason and religion.<sup>ii</sup> For Catholic institutions, the question's normativity leads to a normativity involved in the answer, for if Christian philosophy is possible, let alone exists historically, it ought to have a central role in Catholic philosophy departments and curricula. This centrality, of course, does not mean exclusivity, but it does mean that students in Catholic institutions ought to be afforded the opportunity to encounter Christian philosophy in the richness, depth, and multiplicity it has within the Catholic intellectual tradition.

Gilson distinguishes and critiques three types of positions from which Christian philosophy seems impossible. The first is "pure theologism", which views philosophy as at best a distraction from Christian life and thought, more likely a contaminant of Christian truth, at worst the Devil's tool. Where the first views philosophy as dangerous to faith, the second, "pure rationalism", and the third, a certain kind of neo-Scholasticism, reverse this, regarding faith as compromising to philosophy's autonomy and purely rational character. For the rationalist, faith,

revelation, or dogma are irrational, or sub-rational, for the neo-Scholastic, supra-rational, but to both views they have no legitimate place in philosophy. The Christian philosophizes no differently than the non-Christian, or he philosophizes badly or not at all. The terms Gilson coins or employs have fallen into disuse, but the tendencies they represent remain and take new shapes. One can always find philosophical doctrines or movements analogous to the 1930s debate's rationalism, whether like Bréhier regarding Christian thought as lacking the universality and autonomy philosophy moves within, or like Brunschvicg calling pre-17th century reason immature and closing off "a way of philosophizing that is not that of philosophers."<sup>iii</sup> While proponents of Christian philosophy such as Gilson and Maritain are now numbered among neo-Scholastics, who can hardly be said to dominate contemporary Catholic philosophy departments, the attitude regarding philosophy as purely rational, as necessarily separate from but fortunately coinciding in its conclusions with faith, can still be found.<sup>iv</sup> Aside from these positions, there are other motives, of economics and prestige, for rejecting the notion of Christian philosophy. Joseph Owens, discussing the debate's historical context, sketches an unflattering picture of French Catholic philosophers "profoundly anxious to avoid a ghetto", and interested in "unimpeded access to employment"<sup>v</sup> still relevant today.

Gilson argued that Christian philosophies did exist, and that they were genuinely philosophical, providing numerous characterizations of Christian philosophy in the debate and in later works. Here, reference to several passages must suffice. Gilson argues "faith and reason are rooted in the unity of the concrete subject,"<sup>vi</sup> so that "every Christian philosophy will be traversed, impregnated, nourished by Christianity as by a blood that circulates in it, or rather, like a life that animates it."<sup>vii</sup> The Christian philosopher employs reason, "[b]ut once this philosopher is also a Christian, the exercise of his reason will be that of the reason of a Christian, that is, not a reason of a different type than that of non-Christian philosophers, but a reason that

labors under different conditions,"<sup>viii</sup> these being those of "a subject in which there is something non-rational, his religious faith."<sup>ix</sup> Answering the possible objection that this non-rational faith then vitiates the Christian philosopher's reason, Gilson makes two important remarks. First, he issues a challenge "for someone to show me a pure philosopher. . . in whom reason would not cohabit with any irrational of this sort."<sup>x</sup>

Second, he asks whether "the philosophical life is not precisely a constant effort to bring what is irrational in us to the state of rationality,"<sup>xi</sup> and notes that what characterizes the Christian philosopher is "being convinced of the rational fertility of his faith and being sure that this fertility is inexhaustible."<sup>xii</sup> He calls this "the true meaning of Saint Augustine's *credo ut intelligam* and Saint Anselm's *fides quaerens intellectum*: a Christian's effort to draw some of reason's knowledge from faith in revelation,"<sup>xiii</sup> and calls these formulations "the true definition of Christian philosophy."<sup>xiv</sup> He gives an additional definition:

If there have been philosophies, that is, systems of rational truths, whose existence cannot be explained historically without taking account of the existence of Christianity, these philosophies must bear the name of Christian philosophies. They are philosophies, since they are rational, and they are Christian, since the rationality that they have contributed would not have been conceived without Christianity.<sup>xv</sup>

For Gilson, the historian of philosophy, Christianity has been a "revelation generative of reason."<sup>xvi</sup> His discussions, however, apply just as well to contemporary or near contemporary efforts as to those of the past, including his own work.

Maritain's position distinguishes "between the *nature* of philosophy, of what philosophy is in itself, and the *state* in which it is found factually, historically, in the human subject, and which relates itself to its conditions of existence and exercise in the concrete."<sup>xvii</sup> Considered in terms of its nature, philosophy is determined solely by its object, derives from "strictly rational

or natural intrinsic criteria,"<sup>xviii</sup> so that "it is not dependent on Christian faith, in its object, its principles, or its methods."<sup>xix</sup> This nature, however, is an abstraction, different from every real instance of philosophy. "Once it is a question no longer of philosophy taken in-itself, but of the manner in which the human subject philosophizes, and of the different philosophies brought to the light of day by history's concrete movement, consideration of philosophy's *essence* no longer suffices, and consideration of the *state* imposes itself."<sup>xx</sup>

Philosophy always exists concretely in different specific states, and among these are what Maritain calls a Christian *regime*, a term that for us has an overtly political sense, but which in French has a wide range of meaning ranging from the political sense to a course of diet or exercise. The key sense here is that of concretely structuring or determining possibilities for philosophy, possibilities for philosophy's development. Maritain notes that "in order to acquire in us its full normal development, philosophy demands many rectifications and purifications from the individual, an ascesis not only of reason, but of the heart."<sup>xxi</sup> He continues:

It is not necessary to be Christian. . . . to be convinced of our nature's weakness, and that it suffices that wisdom be difficult for error in that domain to be most frequent for us.

But the Christian believes that grace changes the state of man, by raising his nature to the supernatural order, and by making him know things that reason left to itself cannot attain.

He also believes that in order for reason to attain the highest truths naturally accessible to it without admixture of errors, it needs assistance, whether from within by internal reinforcements, or from without by objects being proposed to it, and he believes this from the fact that under the New Law such an assistance has taken on an institutional value that creates a new regime for the human intelligence.

Philosophy develops differently and farther in a Christian regime, which allows philosophers to attain objects naturally within philosophy's domain that philosophers failed to recognize or

grasp, sometimes adequately, sometimes at all,<sup>xxii</sup> objects “in some way implicit. . . in humanity’s philosophical treasury.”<sup>xxiii</sup> Christianity also provides otherwise lacking definitive solutions to problems philosophy raises; on these, Maritain points out, “one ought to speak not of revelation, but of confirmation.”<sup>xxiv</sup> Lastly, philosophy travels down new roads under a Christian regime, in particular through its relationship to theology. “[H]ow would it not learn much in being led in this way along paths that are not its own?”<sup>xxv</sup> he asks. In Maritain’s view, traveling these paths enlarged the scope of philosophy and its “field of information,”<sup>xxvi</sup> allowing it to become better informed about the divine “through proximity to faith and theology.”<sup>xxvii</sup>

Several issues must be briefly raised here. First, Maritain distinguishes between “an organic Christian regime, that the intellect knew at the best moments of Medieval civilization (not without weeds among the wheat), and a dissociated Christian regime, that it knows in the subsequent periods.”<sup>xxviii</sup> Second, he cautions “that philosophies can be Christian and diverge more or less from the nature of philosophy: then it is less a matter of a Christian philosophy than of the decadence or dissolution of a Christian philosophy,”<sup>xxix</sup> which he takes to be the case in the period “when Occamism reigned in the University.”<sup>xxx</sup> Institutional contexts can be more or less fruitful or sterile for Christian philosophy, and renewal of Catholic intellectual life means in part renewal of these contexts, ongoing renewal of a Christian regime for philosophy, but likewise the self-conscious recovery of philosophy’s sapiential dimension called for by Pope John Paul the Great,<sup>xxxi</sup> recovery of philosophy directed not only to development and deployment of its technical resources but to the central questions of life, including its own role in asking and answering these.

For Maritain, philosophy is not simply what human subjects do, or produce, or encounter. It is a *habitus* of the human being, something that to some degree determines the human being in its thinking, its knowing, its acting, something that can be more or less fully developed.

Institutional contexts do not entirely determine the development of the *habitus* of philosophy in a human being, but they have a crucial role, not only in what is explicitly taught and studied, but, particularly since institutional contexts are contexts in which human beings interact with each other, in the ways philosophy is approached, in the myriad manners in which desires and affective relations are shaped and directed. Philosophers in the making learn what philosophical issues, methods, figures and fora are worth engaging.<sup>xxxii</sup> They learn whether or not philosophy is something deeper and richer than contemporary compartmentalized discourses often marked by the very vices the moderns criticized in late Scholasticism. They learn all of this discursively, but also and just as much through practice, example, and affective relations. This complex dimension of affectivity is ineradicable from philosophy in practice, in the concrete states in which philosophy is actually found. The Christian regime, whether organic or dissociated, in which the philosophical *habitus* develops, engages and shapes this affective dimension, allowing it to play its integral and proper role in philosophy's practice.<sup>xxxiii</sup> This can be quite productively and adequately understood by reference to the Thomistic concept of connaturality, of affective knowledge or knowledge by right inclination.<sup>xxxiv</sup> In this light, a passage cited earlier takes on fuller significance. The full normal development of philosophy, Maritain stated, requires "many rectifications and purifications from the individual, an ascesis not only of reason, but of the heart."<sup>xxxv</sup> This discursive and affective ascesis is required of the individual not only so that the truths that are philosophy's objects can be grasped and then written down and taught, but also of each individual if they wish to understand what is written or taught by others, and moreover, so that they can find joy in these truths.

Marcel (reviewing Gilson's *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*) articulates his position in continuity with Gilson's, but goes beyond it, arguing that a scandal or paradox lies at the heart and root of Christian philosophy. "A Christian philosophy seems to me to be defined by the fact

that it finds its point of ontological friction in an *unique* fact, by which I mean without any analogue, which is the Incarnation.<sup>xxxvi</sup> He suggests that Christian philosophy involves metaphysical reflection on “the implications and the consequences of all orders of that datum, not only unpredictable but contrary to the superficial demands of reason that from the very start *wrongly pose themselves as inviolable*.”<sup>xxxvii</sup> This is not an irrationalism, however, for it involves “critiquing these demands in the name of *higher demands* and consequently of a superior reason that faith in the Incarnation puts precisely in the condition of becoming fully conscious of itself.”<sup>xxxviii</sup> For Marcel, “[t]he most important problem put to philosophy is. . . researching how this fertilization of reason by dogma is possible,”<sup>xxxix</sup> and its resolution lies not in simply noting it, nor in rationalizing dogma, but in “a metaphysical elucidation of reason itself or of the rational content that makes the radically mysterious character reemerge.”<sup>xl</sup> Core to this is the realization that “nature is a *created nature*”, that the “completely natural” is a “pseudo-notion.”<sup>xli</sup>

This bears important implications for philosophy.

[O]ur reason – a *created* reason ordered to the intelligence of *created* nature – must, in deepening itself, recognize what in it exceeds the domain of adequacy to itself. It cannot grasp itself, it seems to me, except as radically unequal to itself, quite far from being able to rest. . . in an intellectual intuition where it would be not only commensurable, but entirely transparent to itself.<sup>xlii</sup>

Christian philosophy’s scandal resides in the mystery of the Incarnation, but “the central light residing in the Incarnation radiates in reality through all of the regions of metaphysics”,<sup>xliii</sup> throughout the mystery of being, including human being and human reason. Marcel goes so far as to say

there is Christian philosophy only there where this paradox, this scandal is not only admitted or even accepted, but *embraced* with a passionate and unrestricted gratitude.

From the moment on when, to the contrary, philosophy seeks by some procedure to attenuate this scandal, to mask the paradox, to reabsorb the revealed datum in a dialectic of pure reason or mind, to this precise degree it ceases to be a Christian philosophy.<sup>xliv</sup>

Christian philosophy involves recognition of and reflection on mystery, “something in which I am myself engaged,”<sup>xlv</sup> confused with or reduced to neither the problematic nor the unknowable.

The “concrete approaches” Marcel highlights lie in “the elucidation of certain specifically spiritual data, such as fidelity, hope, love, where man appears to us grappling with the temptation of renunciation, of folding-back on himself, of interior hardening,”<sup>xlvi</sup> and of these, he suggests that “perhaps fidelity is the most important”, calling it “recognition. . . of something ontologically permanent which lasts and in relation to which we last”, and “perpetuation of a witnessing that, at every moment could be obliterated or renounced.”<sup>xlvii</sup>

Marcel, more than Gilson or Maritain, calls our attention to the personal involvement philosophy’s full development requires, and thereby to the vulnerability of students beginning to be exposed to and initiated into philosophy, a vulnerability that, to be sure, the experienced philosopher also retains, the possibility of allowing philosophy to lose engagement with mystery, to degenerate into technique, to close itself off in one way or another to transcendence, to lose or never even develop its sapiential dimension. Prior to the debate, he articulates an aspect of this, saying “we may have lost touch with the fundamental truth that knowledge implies previous askesis – purification, in fact – and that. . . knowledge in its fullness is not vouchsafed except where it has first been deserved.”<sup>xlviii</sup> One function of the Christian philosopher is to put himself in conditions where the fullness of knowledge can be deserved, and another closely related function is to enable others to do so. Marcel writes, after the debate, “I am one of those who attach an inestimable value to personal encounters. They are a spiritual fact of the highest importance, though unrecognized by traditional philosophy. . . . The virtue of such encounters is

to rouse the inattentive to a reflection or return upon themselves. . .”<sup>xlix</sup> From Marcel’s perspective, and implicit in Gilson’s and Maritain’s perspective, Christian philosophy requires individual ascesis, personal engagement with mystery, or in Gilson’s terms with the inexhaustible rational fertility of the Christian faith, but these commitments already involve interpersonal and institutional contexts. The part that Christian philosophers play in renewal of Catholic intellectual life necessarily extends beyond their own personal philosophical development and exploration to continuously opening and keeping open to students the doors of these possibilities, possibilities of studying, appropriating, even, to give a tired and trite expression a more vigorous sense, of “finding themselves” in a both historical and contemporary actuality of Christian philosophy, philosophy, as Maritain puts it, in a Christian state, a state in which philosophy ought to be found in the Catholic university.

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i. Maurice Blondel was also a participant of the first order of importance. Arguably, Antonin Sertillanges, O.P., and Fernand Van Steenberghen, among others, were of major importance as well. The reasons for leaving any discussion of Blondel out of this paper are twofold: he is currently a less familiar figure to Anglophone audiences; and, a good portion of the Christian philosophy debate derived from the largely unnecessary controversy between the Gilson-Maritain position and the Blondel position. Doing justice to these would require a much longer paper. Suffice it to say that, despite Gilson’s, Maritain’s, and Blondel’s views to the contrary, many of the debate’s participants and commentators (including Marcel) viewed their positions as compatible or even complementary. Cf. Bruno de Solages, “Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne”, *La Vie Intellectuelle*, vol. 25, no. 3, p. 215-228 (1933); Antonin D. Sertillanges, O.P. “De la philosophie chrétienne”, *La Vie Intellectuelle*, 10 Oct 1933; L. Cochet, “En vue d’une philosophie chrétienne” *Revue Apologétique*, Vol. 58, no. 582., p. 257-269.

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(1934); Henri de Lubac, "Sur la philosophie chrétienne, réflexions à la suite d'un débat", *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, vol. 63, no. 3, p. 125-253, English translation: "Retrieving the Tradition: On Christian Philosophy", *Communio*, vol. 19, p. 478-506 (1992)

ii. Emile Bréhier noted from the start that the "difficulty here is more normative [dans le droit] than factual [dans le fait]", "Y-a-t'il une philosophie chrétienne?", *Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale*, vol. 38, n. 2, p. 133. Translation author's (note: all translations, unless otherwise noted are the author's).

Aimé Forest discusses this as well, noting that the debate, originally seeming to be primarily historical, was much deeper. "Christian philosophy would be the object of historical notation. However, a normative question [question de droit] is posed alongside the factual question, at the same time as it; we soon see actually how it is implied in historical affirmations themselves, and the historian encounters them as he follows out his own thought. The idea of a Christian philosophy doubtless presupposes a judgement on the nature of knowledge that faith has us reach, but already also an interpretation of reason, of its value, its scope, its specific role." *La philosophie chrétienne: Juvisy, 11 Septembre 1933* (Paris: Cerf. 1933), p. 22.

iii. *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie*, Session of 21 March 1931 (henceforth cited as *BSfP*), p. 76. Ramon Fernandez provided an interesting characterization of the "rationalism" under discussion "This is what is happening: Catholic rationalism is waging a lively offensive at the moment when skeptical, or naturalist, rationalism is transforming itself in its depths, so that what the former retains of reason and values corresponds to what the latter reduces to the rank of purely verbal dialectic." "Religion et Philosophie", *Nouvelle Revue Française*, vol. 38 (1932) p. 903. Two points are important: 1) secular modes of thought that conceive of rationality as necessarily secular have no monopoly on rationalism, or more precisely on rationality and the philosophical effort to maintain, develop and apply it; 2) secular forms of rationalism have, in the course of modernity, given up and lost familiarity with a significant portion of reason's heritage. Skeptical or naturalist rationalism is really a deficient, and in certain respects irrational type of rationalism.

iv. Indeed, my fellow panel member Matthew Lomanno's paper "Maritain's Moral Philosophy" argued from precisely such a neo-Scholastic perspective. It is refreshing to see that the sort of neo-Scholasticism that, in its understanding of the relationship between reason and revelation, philosophy and theology, must rule out the possibility of Christian philosophy, is not as uncommon as one might fear, not least because it means that Gilson's, Maritain's, Sertillanges', Blondel's, and Marcel's varied critiques of that sort of Neo-Scholasticism are again of contemporary relevance.

v. Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R, *Towards a Christian Philosophy* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 1990), p. 9

vi. *BsfP*, p. 45-6

vii. *loc.cit.*, p.46

viii. *loc.cit.*, p. 47

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ix. *loc.cit.*, p. 47

x. *loc.cit.*, p. 47

xi. *loc.cit.*, p. 47

xii. *loc.cit.*, p. 48

xiii. *loc.cit.*, p. 48

xiv. *loc.cit.*, p. 48

xv. *loc.cit.*, p. 48

xvi. *loc.cit.*, p. 39

xvii. *loc.cit.*, p. 59 For very similar translations of nearly the same material cited here, Cf. Edward H. Flannery's translation of Maritain's *An Essay on Christian Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), a reworking of a paper delivered at the Université de Louvain in December 1931, that paper itself a reworking of Maritain's contribution to the March 1931 S.f.P meeting.

xviii. *loc.cit.*, p. 62

xix. *loc.cit.*, p. 62

xx. *loc.cit.*, p. 63

xxi. *loc.cit.*, p. 63

xxii. *loc.cit.*, p. 63

xxiii. *loc.cit.*, p. 64

xxiv. *loc.cit.*, p. 65

xxv. *loc.cit.*, p. 65

xxvi. *loc.cit.*, p. 65

xxvii. *loc.cit.*, p. 65. It must be noted, Maritain does not grammatically assert this here, but poses a rhetorical question. "It becomes informed about the sensible when in contact with the natural sciences, so why would it not become informed about the divine by being in contact with faith and theology?"

xxviii. *loc.cit.*, p. 68

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xxix. *loc.cit.*, p. 68

xxx. *loc.cit.*, p. 68

xxxi. *Fides et Ratio*, sec. 81

xxxii. This perennial issue was thematized again two decades back, in relation to Christian philosophy but not explicitly connected with the Christian philosophy debate, by Alvin Plantinga's seminal "Advice to Christian Philosophers", *Faith and Philosophy*, vol. 1 no. 3 (1984). In James A. Keller's later exchange with Plantinga, "Reflections on a Methodology for Christian Philosophers" (Keller); "Method in Christian Philosophy: a Reply" (Plantinga); and "Method in Christian Philosophy: Further Reflections" (Keller), *Faith and Philosophy*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1988), these issues of the professional academic setting (largely Analytic) of American philosophy and Christian philosophy are further discussed.

There are philosophers who seem to suggest that Christian philosophy need no longer justify itself apologetically, polemically, or critically against other philosophies that effectively rule it out, in a current contemporary situation of philosophical pluralism (e.g. Joseph Owens to some extent), or as a result of the "one-time issue ha[ving] been effectively, even decisively, disposed of." Henry Veatch, "The Problems and the Prospects of a Christian Philosophy – Then and Now" *The Monist* (1992), p. 381. This seems to me unjustifiedly optimistic.

xxxiii. Joseph Owens suggests that this is one function of Christian philosophy. "[P]ositively, Christian philosophy will bring out the marvelous intellectual appeal of Christian belief and life that is grounded by the revealed truths. From this angle, Christian philosophy should surely rank with poetry music, painting and architecture in enhancing the impression of the Christian message upon the human mind." "The Need for Christian Philosophy", *Faith and Philosophy*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1994).

At the Christian philosophy debate's second phase's (1932-34) end, Yves Simon suggested something similar: "Humanist study of man implies an intimate fusion of the values of truth, values of beauty, and values of morality incompatible with scientific study. Lastly, it implies affective reactions entirely foreign to any scientific ideal. The intellect acquires the humanities only by broadly making itself love's disciple. In short, humanist formation seems in a superlative way to be *an existential knowledge of existential man*. That is enough for one to have to conclude that it will have to be intrinsically Christian if it is not to be false.", "Philosophie chrétienne: Notes complémentaires", *Études Carmélitaines*, April 1934, p. 117.

xxxiv. Correlatively, philosophical positions unable to conceptualize something like affective knowledge, or which regard affectivity as merely an impediment to cognition or reasoning, will not only be useless, but most likely block the way to understanding this affective dimension in the actual and concrete practice of philosophy.

xxxv. *BSfP*, p. 63

xxxvi. Gabriel Marcel, "A propos de *L'esprit de la Philosophie médiévale* par M. E. Gilson", *Nouvelle Revue des Jeunes*, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 312)

xxxvii. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 312

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xxxviii. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 312

xxxix. Marcel, "A propos de *L'esprit de la Philosophie médiévale* par M. E. Gilson", *Nouvelle Revue des Jeunes*, vol. 4, no. 12, p. 1305

xl. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 1305

xli. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 1305

xlii. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 1305-6

xliii. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 312

xliv. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 312

xlv. Gabriel Marcel, "Position du mystère ontologique et ses approches concrètes", *Les Etudes Philosophiques*, vol. 7, no.4 (1933) p. 96. This article is translated, minus the responses by Blondel and Bréhier to Marcel's presentation, in *Being and Having*, trans. Katherine Farrer (New York: Harper. 1965), p. 116-121. Farrer's translation there and my own here are close, but mine is somewhat more literal.

xlvi. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 98-9

xlvii. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 99

xlviii. Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, trans. Katherine Farrer (New York: Harper. 1965), p. 190

xlix. Marcel, *loc.cit.*, p. 208-9